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SILENCE AND SILENCING: THEIR CENTRIPETAL AND
CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN LEGAL COMMUNICATION,
PEDAGOGY AND DISCOURSE
Margaret E. Montoya*
Language and voice have been subjects of great interest to scholars working in the
areas of Critical Race Theory and Latina/o Critical Legal Theory. Silence, a
counterpart of voice, has not, however, been well theorized. This Article is an in-
vitation to attend to silence and silencing. The first part of the Article argues that
one's use of silence is an aspect of communication that, like accents, is related to
one's culture and may correlate with one's racial identity. The second part of the
Article posits that silence can be a force that disrupts the dominant discourse
within the law school classroom, creating learning spaces where deeper dialogue
from different points of view can occur. The third part of the Article focuses on the
silencing of racial issues within legal discourse and public policy debates, a si-
lencing that is a mechanism for racial control and hegemony. The Article uses the
work and imagery of Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian literary critic, to analyze how
silence can have centering and de-centering linguistic force, offering performative
and communicative choices that affect racial identities.
[T] he centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in
a "unitary language," operate in the midst of heteroglossia
.... [L]anguage is stratified not only into linguistic dialects
... but also-and for us this is the essential point-into lan-
guages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups
[and] "professional"... languages.'
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law, A.B. 1972, San Diego
State University;J.D. 1978 Harvard Law School. Comments are invited by the author.
This paper benefited from discussions with colleagues and students over several years. I am
particularly grateful to my UNM colleagues Christine Zuni-Cruz, Scott Taylor, and Kenneth
Bobroff. Thanks to Lisa Iglesias for the gracious invitation to participate in this Symposium and
to Sharon Hom, Barbara Creel, Jan Schuetz, Kim Scheppele, and Yvonne A. Tamayo, who
participated in a panel I organized on "Silence and Secrets" for the 1997 AALS meeting in San
Francisco. Thanks also to Christine Harrington, who invited me to speak at the Law and Society
Institute at NYU, where I presented an early version of this paper and to Juan Velasco of Santa
Clara University, who contributed ideas and moral support. Special thanks to the research pool
and to Rob Mead and Lisa Peters of the UNM Law Library for extraordinary help and to Pam-
ela Alford, Zahraa Noorali Velji, and Adam Wolf of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law for
encouragement and helpful comments.
1. M. M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 271-72 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl
Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981). It is sometimes said that the centrifugal force is a
"pseudo" force because it exists only in what physicists call rotating reference frames and
not in inertial reference frames. See Centrifugal Force: A Fictitious Force? (visited Decem-
ber 13, 1999) <http://observe.iw.nasa.gov/nasa/space/centrifugal/centrifugal5.html>.
Consequently an observer watching a car go around a curve would observe the car being
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INTRODUCTION
Language analysis has been a topic of major concern within
Latina/o Critical Legal Studies ("LatCrit") since its inception.2
LatCrit scholars have developed a number of themes in analyzing
how language has been an important mechanism for the economic
and cultural marginalization of Latina/o communities as well as of
other communities of color. However, language always has been,
and remains, a vehicle for resistance and a resource for the collec-
tive identity of Latina/o communities. 4 Major LatCrit themes
include 1)the connection between language and identity;' 2)the
historical, geographic, and familial dimensions of language loss
and forced assimilation;6 and 3)the relationship between language
and racial performances.7
"forced" to the center of the curve through centripetal force while the occupants of the car
would feel the centrifugal forces pushing the car toward the edge of the curve. See id.
2. The history of LatCrit is partially recorded in the symposia that have been pub-
lished in connection with conferences and gatherings that have fostered this new school of
jurisprudence and critical theory. See Colloquium, Representing Latina/o Communities:
Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996); Symposium, LatCrit Theory:
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO
L.REv. 1 (1997); Symposium, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latina/o Communi-
ties Through LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 1 (1998); Symposium: Latinas/os
and the Law, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998), 85 CAL. L. REv. 1087 (1997); Symposium, Compara-
tive Latinas/os: Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1999);
Symposium, Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers: LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersec-
tions, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (forthcoming 2000).
3. See Steven Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and
English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1027 (1996);Juan F. Perea, Demography and
Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 269 (1992).
4. See generally THE LATINA/O CONDITION, "PART XI: ENGLISH-ONLY, BILINGUALISM,
INTERPRETERS: YOU MEAN I CAN'T SPEAK SPANISH?" (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 1998).
5. See Madeleine Plasencia, "Suppressing the Mother Tongue"-Anti-Subordination and the
Legal Struggle Over Control of the Means of Communication, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 989 (1999)
(positing that language contributes to a person's self-identity and her self-esteem).
6. See John Hayakawa Torok, Finding the Me in LatCrit Theory: Thoughts on Language
Acquisition and Loss, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1019 (1999) (arguing that language analysis can
help clarify the racialization of Latina/o and Asian American groups by comparing racial
discourses that use the White-over-Black language with those that use the "colonizing settler-
over-native" language).
7. See Margaret E. Montoya, Mdscaras, Trenzas y Grefias: Un/Masking the Self While
Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 219 (1994), ap-
pearing contemporaneously in 15 CHICANO-LATINO L.REv. 1, 35 (1994) (an enactment
through bilingual autobiographical narratives of the idea that race is performance-how we
show ourselves to the world).
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Silence and silencing have been among other linguistic con-
cepts' that have already appeared in the writings of Race Crits and
LatCrits exploring the relationship between language and subor-
dination. For example, Patricia Williams has noted that while the
long silence of African Americans has been broken and their his-
tory of being spoken for is over, the struggle now is to give their
stories "a hearing of [their] own" so they are not merely the ironic
sound of "silent voice [s] .,9 In addition, the official silencing repre-
sented by the English-Only Movement through its use of law to
proscribe the public use of Spanish and other minority languages
has been vehemently criticized by LatCrits and others.'0 Some of
the most significant work on silence and silencing has been done
within Queer Theory, exposing the ways in which invisibility and
its counterpart, inaudibility, are imposed on sexual minorities.'
Queer Theory also examines discriminatory public policies that
aim to silence gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered persons,
such as the military's purportedly liberal "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
regulations.
2
Other aspects of silence, such as performative and communica-
tive aspects, have been eloquently described by the Asian
American Crits-particularly by Sharon Hom l- and Margaret
8. For a superb article on accent discrimination, see Mari Matsuda, The Voices ofAmer-
ica: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a New Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE
L.J. 1329 (1991). See also Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their
Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347
(1997).
9. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG: ON THE PERSISTENCE OF PREJUDICE
138-49 (1995).
10. SeeJuan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On The Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv.
965 (1995); Yvonne Tamayo, Literal Silencing/Silenciando La Lengua, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 995
(1999).
11. Some of the foundational work has been done by the Chicana writer and cultural
critic Gloria Anzalddia. See GLORIA ANZALDUJA, BORDERLANDS, LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MES-
TIZA (1987); GLORIA ANZALDUA, MAKING FACES, MAKING SOUL: HACIENDO CARAS (1990)
[hereinafter ANZALDUA, MAKING FACES].
12. SeeJewelle Gomez, Because Silence is Costly, in FORTY-THREE SEPTEMBERS (1993);
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Claiming" and "Speaking" Who We Are: Black Gays and Lesbians,
Racial Politics, and the Million Man March, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY:
A CRITICAL READER 28 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay
Rights, Civil Rights: The Deployment of Race/Sexual Orientation Analogies in the Debates about the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell"Policy, in BLACK MEN, supra, at 283; OLIVA M. ESPiN, WOMEN CROSSING
BOUNDARIES: A PSYCHOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF SEXUALITY 133-
44 (1999).
13. See CHINESE WOMEN TRAVERSING DIASPORA: MEMOIRS, ESSAY, AND POETRY
(Sharon Hom, ed. 1999) (citing the work of King-Kwok Cheung, ARTICULATE SILENCES:
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(H.R.) Chon. 4 In describing the work of other Chinese women
artists and writers, Horn calls attention to the "many tongues that
silence, too, can speak."' 5 She cautions against "the logocentric
privileging of 'voice' that can colonize the very differences we seek
to recognize.
" 6
This Article seeks to deepen the analysis of the interplay be-
tween the subordinating aspects of being silenced and the
liberatory aspects of silence, its expressive and performative aspects
that are part of our linguistic and racial repertoires. Languages are
not neutral vehicles for the transmission of thoughts. Instead, lan-
guages are imbedded in the history and struggles of the people
who use them. I posit that silence is a crucial component of the
languages of communities of color-especially those that are
bi/multilingual. Bi/multilingual communities deploy silence in
ways that connect them to others in their own racial/ethnic com-
munities and distinguish them from the dominant monolingual
English majority. Thus, silence can disturb and disrupt the linguis-
tic hegemony that is inherent in and coalesces the power relations
between the dominant majority and communities of color, rela-
tions that are stabilized by the ideology of White supremacy.
I relate silence within cultural discourse to silence in classroom
discourse and to silence in legal discourse to show how silence and
silencing are used to draw and maintain the' borders of racialized
power. The three concepts build on one another: One needs to
have an understanding of silence and silencing as gendered and
cross-cultural discourses to understand silence and silencing as
pedagogical discourses; and finally one needs to understand both
silence and silencing as legal discourse. (See Figure 1.) In other
words, in order to understand how silence and silencing infiltrate
the law and its structures and actors, one needs to understand how
legal pedagogy compounds the potentialities of silence and silenc-
ing that are present in the linguistic relationships of a multiracial,
polyglot, and fragmented society.
HISAYE YAMAMOTO, MAXINE HONG KINGSTON, Joy KOGAWA (1993) and the choreography
of Eleanor Yung).
14. See Margaret (H. R.) Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law: Ethnic
Specimens, NativeInformants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. Am. L.J. 4 (1995).
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id.
[VOL. 5:847
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FIGURE 1
I Part Three: Legal Discourse I
1. The Imagery Of Bakhtin's Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces-
Mikhail Bakhtin, an early Twentieth Century Russian literary critic,
did foundational work through his study of the novel in articulat-
ing how language is heteroglossic (literally "different tongues"). 7
Bakhtin contended that the meaning within language is not static;
any utterance has multiple meanings.' Moreover, the meanings of
words evolve over time and from place to place.' 9 Bakhtin explains,
[L]anguage is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents
the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between
the present and past, between differing epochs of the past,
between different socio-ideological groups in the present, be-
tween tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a
bodily form. These "languages" of heteroglossia intersect
each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying
"languages.,20
See BAKHTIN, supra note 1, at 263 et seq.
See id. at 272.
See id.
Id. at 291.
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Bakhtin argued that meaning occurred because of this heteroglos-
sia that both resulted from and contributed to "dialogic
relationships"-the multitude of historical, social, and economic
aspects of events that affected and shaped meaning.2' A core char-
acteristic of Bakhtin's conceptualization of language was its
dialogic nature. For him, language was interactive, understandable
"only in terms of its inevitable orientation towards another."22
Using a Bakhtinian vocabulary, I assert that legal language and
legal discourse seek to be "unitary" in their rejection of certain
types of "heteroglossia," especially in their resistance to the lan-
guages and silences of subordinated groups, such as people of
color, sexual minorities, and others who have been historically op-
pressed.
The beginning epigram from Bakhtin about the centripetal and
centrifugal forces of language suggests the central theme of this
paper.2 3 I posit that the law and traditional legal discourse,
grounded in an ideology of White supremacy, produce a centripe-
tal force that constantly centralizes power and privilege within the
hands of those dedicated to maintaining the status quo. On the
other hand, the languages of outsiders produce centrifugal forces
that decentralize and destabilize that power and privilege. (See
Figure 2.) Silence and silencing are important features of this ten-
sion between the centripetal force and the centrifugal forces that
inhere in language.
21. See id. at 426.
22. GEORGE KALAMARAS, RECLAIMING THE TACIT DIMENSION: SYMBOLIC FORM IN THE
RHETORIC OF SILENCE 27 (1994) (quoting Terry Eagleton, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 117 (1983)).
23. Michael Holquist, a leading Bakhtinian scholar, describes the centripetal and cen-
trifugal forces: "These are respectively the centralizing and decentralizing ... forces in any
language or culture.... The rulers and the high poetic genres of any era exercise a cen-
tripetal-a homogenizing and hierarchicizing-influence; the centrifugal (decrowning,
dispersing) forces of the clown, mimic and rogue create alternative 'degraded' genres down
below." BAKHTIN, supra note 1, at 425.
[VOL. 5:847
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FIGURE 2
Centrifugal (or Decentering) Forces:
Heteroglossic Silences
I use the imagery of centripetal force in connection with the
subordinating consequences of silencing. Throughout this Article,
I develop the idea that persons and communities of color are si-
lenced by the dominant majority, who maintain racial hegemony,
in part, by enforcing a "unitary" language with a controlled and
limited set of meanings. In part, this occurs by authorizing a legal
pedagogy that creates a cadre of legal professionals who have
been socialized to accept a linguistic regime in which the topic of
race is not discussed. These legal professionals-judges, lawyers,
and law professors-participate in and reproduce a legal hierarchy
that depends on silence and silencing. One way that the dominant
majority maintains its racial hegemony is by privileging certain
types of silence (such as the constitutional right against self-
incrimination)24 and by ritualizing other types of silence (such as
the typical responses to racialized hate speech).
24. See generally HAIG BOSMAJIAN, THE FREEDOM NOT TO SPEAK (1999) (arguing that
the freedom to be silent is as politically important as the freedom of speech); PETER MIRFIELD,
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
270 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 33:3
Comparatively, I use the imagery of centrifugal force in connec-
tion with the liberatory heteroglossic potential and reality of
silence. Communities of color use silence to communicate resis-
tance and opposition to those who marginalize them. 5 The
meanings of silence are complex, varied, and often beyond the
interpretive understanding of the dominant culture. Such resis-
tance is also evident in the law school classroom, where students of
color can withdraw their participation as a way of destabilizing the
power dynamics and resisting the pressures to assimilate to the so-
cializing norms of the credentializing experience.
2. Organization of Article-This Article is an invitation to notice
and attend to silence as it is used by people of color, especially in
classrooms. First it explores how silence and race are correlated to
different language systems. Second, it analyzes how silence is expe-
rienced in the law school classroom. Finally, this Article looks at
how silence is managed through legal discourse. This Article is also
a preliminary and tentative exploration of silence and silencing as
discursive mechanisms used by this society to sustain racial ar-
rangements within an ideology of White supremacy.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, a noted sociologist and sociolegal
scholar, has written that silence has been neglected as an object of
study by Western social scientists for these four reasons:
[First,] silence constitutes a threat not only to accepted scien-
tific boundaries but also to established methods of social
research. Second, social scientists tend to feel more confident
in speculating with words about words than in speculating
with words about silence.... Third, the usefulness of studies
of silence has not yet been demonstrated, and will not be so
until the language/silence rhythms in different societies be-
gin to be decoded. Fourth, and most importantly, Western
civilization is inherently biased against silence and this neces-
sarily affects our scientific preferences and capabilities.
Acknowledging these impediments, this Article is an attempt to
develop a concatenated analysis of silence and silencing. As more
fully described below, this analysis links silence as it is used in
SILENCE, CONFESSIONS AND IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1997) (examining the source
and extent of the right to remain silent).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 112-45 for examples of the use of silence by
women of color to communicate resistance to or awareness of subordination.
26. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 148-50(1995).
[VOL. 5:847
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communication and performance by subordinated racial groups,
usually within languages other than English, with the classroom
silence of students of color as well as with the silencing of the topic
of race within legal discourse.
27Because silence is by its nature ambiguous, it can be difficult to
distinguish silence from silencing. That is, it can be difficult to
know when someone is holding silence as a matter of will and
agency in contrast to being "silenced"-made to be quiet because
her verbal and/or nonverbal expressions are rejected, devalued, or
misinterpreted. Consequently, each section provides examples of
how subordinated groups are silent in courtrooms, classrooms,
and as subjects of legal discourse. The analysis attempts to "decode
the language/silence rhythms" in these examples, as proposed by
Professor Santos.
28
The first part of this paper surveys the extensive literature on si-
lence produced within the disciplines of socio-linguistics,
literature, religion, literary criticism, and music. I focus on the
cross-cultural meanings of silence and its use by peoples of color,
especially women of color. Silence has multiple meanings and
therefore I discuss how it is invoked in different ways. More impor-
tant for purposes of the racial analysis of this paper, I describe
silence as a characteristic of the communication systems of people
of color, especially those from non-English linguistic communities,
and therefore an important mechanism by which they perform
their racial identities. I argue that there is a nexus between racial
discrimination and racialized bilingualism and the use of silence.
The judicial opinions in Hernandez v. New York,29 where Latinos
were excluded from jury service because of their hesitancy (that is,
their momentary silence) in saying that they could abide by the of-
ficial interpretation of the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses,
demonstrate that silence can have discriminatory consequences for
language minorities. 30 I contend that the silence was racially coded
by the prosecutor, who arrogated to himself the right to interpret
the silence in a way that was detrimental to the potential jurors and
devastating in its consequences for the citizenship rights of the
Latina/o community.
3
'
27. See ADAM JAWORSKI, THE POWER OF SILENCE: SOCIAL AND PRAGMATIC PERSPEC-
TIVES 69 (1993).
28. See supra text accompanying note 26.
29. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
30. See id. at 355-58.
31. For details regarding cultural citizenship, see WILLIAM V. FLORES & RINA BEN-
MAYOR, LATINO CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: CLAIMING IDENTITY, SPACE AND RIGHTS 57 (1997).
855SUMMER 2000] Silence and Silencing
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The second part of the Article builds on the analysis of cultural
discourse laid out in the first part. Utilizing the research on silence
from other disciplines, I draw implications for the law school class-
room, where silencing is an important aspect of the experience of
many students of color. Using the work of Paolo Friere,' I posit
that it is possible to teach to the silence and challenge the practices
that systematically mute the voices of the students of color. Fur-
ther, I propose that silence is a pedagogical tool that can be used
effectively to normalize the different communication styles that are
present in a classroom with racial, ethnic, and gender diversity,
and to de-emphasize the dominant language patterns of the White
majority. In this way silence has the centrifugal forces described by
Bakhtin. The use of silence-especially by a professor who is a
woman of color-carries some risk because it can create disorient-
ing experiences that are likely to be resented by some students. On
the other hand, it can be a significant positive signal to students of
color that their language patterns are not deficient. Moreover,
within law school clinics, the skills of client interviewing and coun-
seling can be improved through the understanding and use of
silence, especially for the significant portion of low-income clients
who are from communities of color.
Finally, in the last section of the Article I examine the dynamics
of silence and silencing within the larger parameters of the law
and legal discourse. Using the insights about cultural discourse
from the first section and racial power as it is reproduced by the
discursive dynamics within law school classroom from the second
section, I focus on the pervasive silencing of the topic of race as it
relates to legal doctrine, institutions, and actors. Information
about identity markers-racialized, gendered, and sexual facts that
define reality and histories for subordinated populations-is sys-
tematically defined as irrelevant by judges, legislators, and law
professors. I discuss one well-known case, Meritor Savings Bank v.
• 34
Vinson,3 and one obscure one, Williams v. City of New York,34 to show
that traditional legal reasoning ignores the racial contexts of dis-
putes. In this way silence can have a hegemonic effect, deluding us
into thinking that race, gender, sexual orientation, and other
characteristics of identity do not have to be mentioned because
they do not matter; their alleged transparency proves their irrele-
vance.
32. See infta text accompanying note 186.
33. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
34. 564 N.Y.S.2d 464 (App. Div. 1991).
[VOL. 5:847
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In this last section, I argue that whole areas of law, such as prop-
erty, criminal law, and constitutional law, are taught with a
deliberate inattention to issues of race. This silence creates a
worldview that is imbedded with the values and interests of White
supremacy.
I conclude the Article with a personal narrative 35 involving hate
speech. Hate speech is a particularly difficult legal injury because it
implicates so much about silence and silencing. With the narrative
I try to use the technique of implicature36 to show how hate speech
exposes the contradictions in legal practices in a particularly effec-
tive manner. I link this personal narrative to an historical one
about SorJuana Inez de la Cruz, a Seventeenth Century poet and
nun who was silenced by the Catholic Church after publicly sup-
porting the right of women to study and have intellectual
freedom.3 ' Ecclesiastical silences and silencings were as imposed
and controlled by the Church in that era as legal silences and si-
lencings are by the nation-state today.
I. SILENCE AND SILENCING: THEIR CROSS-CULTURAL
AND CROSS-RACIAL ASPECTS
A. Theorizing Silence And Silencing: Their Cross-Cultural
and Gendered Qualities
And so / We stay / Quiiiiiiiet 3
8
Belonging to a society and participating in the political and
civil life of the society are basic rights of citizens.39 Being denied
the right to participate and therefore to belong can have devas-
tating consequences for a community, especially when the denial
35. As this Article was about to go to press, I decided to delete this narrative and so in-
formed the editors. The telling of the story had been cathartic and healing for me, but
ultimately I felt that the story might have more emotional weight than this last section
needed. I subsequently learned from the editors that Professor Dorothy Roberts had com-
mented on the story in her response to my paper so I concluded it was only fair to leave the
paper in the form the commentators had received it. Even now, however, deciding to break
my silence about this incident is a difficult and conflicting decision for me. The narrative is
in print with my daughters' consent.
36. See infra text accompanying note 120.
37. See infra text accompanying note 280-86.
38. Maria Herrera-Sobek, Silent Scream, quoted in TEY DIANA REBOLLEDO, WOMEN
SINGING IN THE SNOW: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF CHICANA LITERATURE 121 (1995).
39. See generally Flores & Benmayor, supra note 31.
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is related to one's collective relations, one's racial/ethnic identity,
or one's way of being in the world as learned from one's family
and community. "Cultural citizenship refers to the right to be dif-
ferent (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with respect
to the norms of the dominant national community, without com-
promising one's right to belong, in the sense of participating in
the nation-state's democratic processes."4° This section examines
the way silence can be used as a racial marker, that is, as a way of
being seen as different by the dominant culture or as a way of dif-
ferentiating oneself from the dominant community. I demonstrate
that such differences can lead to limitations on the exercise of one
of the main prerogatives of citizenship, namely, the right to serve
as ajuror.
The spoken word is one of the primary tools of lawyers and law
professors. The law demands that students and practitioners use
words effectively. Communication, however, is not just a matter of
using words; much of the meaning of our interactions is transmit-
ted through nonverbal gestures, or paralingual noises that
accompany our words-the smiles, frowns, eyebrow movements,
the ums and the ah ha's. Silence is also one of the choices available
to us in our repertoire of communicative devices. Silence, how-
ever, is differentiated from words, gestures, and utterances in that
it is both the context and the background for spoken communica-
tion and part of the code of meaning.
Theories connecting silence to other elements of vocal and non-
vocal communication are useful as a basis for evaluating the
sociopolitical and sociolegal consequences of silence and its
counterpart, voice. An analysis of silence came from Bernard P.
Dauenhauer, who offered three profiles of silence: "intervening
silence," as with the timing ofjokes or the pacing of literary works;
"fore-and-after silence," the fringe of silence that precedes and
follows expressions of sound; and "deep silence."41 Silence in any
of these profiles can be either benign or malign; it "can be as
distressing and misery-laden as it can be consoling and peace-
40. Id. at 57.
41. Bernard P. Dauenhauer, On Silence, 3 RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY 9, 10-24
(1973). Dauenhauer further subdivided deep silence into the silence of intimates, liturgical
silence, and what he called the "silence of the 'to-say.'" Id. at 18-24. This last mode, the
"what-is-said," is embedded in the "silence of what-ought-to-be-said." Id.; see also Robert L.
Scott, Rhetoric and Silence, 36 WESTERN SPEECH 146 (1972) (exploring the privilege or obli-
gation of remaining silent and its relation to contemplation and rhetoric); Richard L.
Johannesen, The Functions of Silence: A Plea for Communication Research, 38 WESTERN SPEECH
25 (1974) (extending the examination of silence to its role in political and civic life and in
pathological settings such as counseling and psychotherapy).
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bearing., 42 Dauenhauer's early analysis of silence ended with a
statement of its characteristics: "Silence is, inter alia 1) a deliberate
human performance. But 2) it cannot be completely performed by
an individual acting alone. 4 3 This notion of silence as an
interactive process is central to an understanding of silence and is
consistent with the Bakhtinian view of language as dialogic."
Deborah Tannen," and her collaborator Muriel Saville-Troike, 6
were among the first to include a gendered and cross-cultural
analysis in their study of silence.4 7 Saville-Troike described silence
as having different dimensions, structures, and symbolic meanings,
with its use acquired in ways that are analogous to the acquisition
of spoken language according to the norms of particular speech
communities.4 ' For her, silence has what she terms "dimensions":
first in the sense that not all silence is communicative; that is, at
times silence is merely the absence of noise.49 Secondly, the use of
silence is subject to the norms and conventions of different speech
communities.
As with words, the use of silence is regulated in different cultures
according to age, rank, gender, and other social characteristics and
may be proscribed or prescribed at different times and in different
places.51 Religious or meditative silence, as within the Quaker, 
52
Church of God,53 Catholic, and Hindu54 traditions, illustrates varia-
tions in the manner in which silence is regulated or defined.
42. Dauenhauer, supra note 41, at 23.
43. Id. at 26.
44. See supra text accompanying note 21.
45. Deborah Tannen has written two best sellers but is also a prolific scholar. See gener-
ally DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT: How CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKES
OR BREAKS YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS (1986); YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN
AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990).
46. Muriel Saville-Troike is a Professor of English at the University of Arizona.
47. See generally PERSECTIVES ON SILENCE (Deborah Tannen & Muriel Saville-Troike,
eds., 1985).
48. See Muriel Saville-Troike, The Place of Silence in an Integrated Theory of Communica-
tion, in PERSPECTIVES ON Silence, supra note 47, at 3-18. For an annotated bibliography of
early works on silence, see Emma Mufioz-Duston &Judith Kaplan, A Sampling of Sources on
Silence, in PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE 235 supra note 47.
49. See Saville-Troike, supra note 48, at 4.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Daniel N. Maltz, Joyful Noise and Reverent Silence: The Significance of Noise in Penecostal
Worship, in PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE, supra note 47, at 121-23. Maltz writes, "[t]he concept of
'silence' was a central aspect not only of the spiritual behavior of the individual Quaker, but
also of the primary form of corporate Quaker worship, the 'silent meeting"' Id. at 123.
53. For a novel analysis of scriptural interpretation of silence, see JOHN CARROLL
BROWN, BEYOND THE SILENCE: THE ROLE OF SILENCE IN DETERMINING AUTHORITY (1999).
54. See Saville-Troike, supra note 48, at 7.
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The manner in which silence is used can also depend on the ex-
tent to which information is communicated explicitly or implicitly,
which can correlate with whether the culture is individualistic or
collectivistic. 55 Linguists use the terms "low-context communication"
to refer to direct and precise statements in which meanings are
embedded in the messages being transmitted and "high-context
communication" to language systems that involve understatements,
indirect statements, and the interpretation of pauses in conversa-
tion.56 Low-context communication is more characteristic of
individualistic cultures, and high-context communication is more
characteristic of collectivistic cultures. Silence is highly valued in
high-context cultures, while in low-context cultures, directness is
valued and ambiguity will be eliminated by explicit communica-
* 581tion.
Another aspect of silence is its capacity to be used intentionally
or inadvertently to deceive or mislead. 9 For example, silence is
sometimes introduced as evidence in trial proceedings to deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of a defendant.60 Silence, however, is
nuanced and may be difficult to interpret. Saville-Troike offers the
following symbolic or attitudinal meanings for silence: nonpartici-
pation, anger, sorrow, respect, disapproval, dislike, indifference,
alienation, avoidance, mitigation, concealment, mystification, dis-
simulation, and image manipulation."' Silence is communicative in
other ways as well. For instance, it often substitutes for words in
emotionally charged conversations, in delicate situations, or when
the topic involves taboos. In Japanese culture, silence is so impor-
tant that there is a word, ma, for spaces or pauses in conversation
that express meaning.63 One linguist has listed the following typical
meanings of silence: 1) lack of information; 2) no pressure to talk;
55. See JOSEPH A. DEVITO, THE INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION BOOK 52 (8th ed.
1998).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 54.
59. See Saville-Troike, supra note 48, at 7.
60. See id.
61. Seeid. at 17.
62. See id. at 7.
63. See Tomohiro Hasegawa & William B. Gudykunst, Silence in Japan and the United
States, 29 J. OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 668, 669 (1998). The purpose of Hasegawa's
and Gudykunst's study was to examine the use and attitudes toward silence in Japan and the
United States. This study found that silence was viewed more negatively in Japan than in the
United States, contrary to prevailing cultural stereotypes. See Hasegawa & Gudykunst, supra,
at 681.
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3) thinking about what to say; 4) speed of thinking; 5) avoid ar-
gument; 6) agreement; 7) disagreement; 8) doubt; 9) boredom;
10) uncertainty; 11) wondering; 12) impoliteness; 13) punishment;
14) disturbance; 15) inarticulateness; 16) concern; 17) preoccupa-
tion; 18) isolation; 19) anger; and 20) empathic exchange.6 4
Just as silence has meaning in verbal communications systems, it
also has meaning in other systems of expression, such as the arts.
Musical, theatrical, and artistic works often integrate silence as a
purposeful element of the production: two extreme examples are
John Cage's famous composition, 4'33," and Robert Rauschen-
berg's White Paintings.65 Cage's composition consists of four
minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence and Rauschenberg's
canvas is perfectly blank.66 Both have been described "as neutral
surface [s], collecting the surrounding environment into the work
itself.
67
Silence is also communicative in the sense that it is learned in
the same way that voiced communication is learned. The study of
the acquisition of speech patterns by children reveals that in learn-
ing how to make the appropriate sounds for words, children also
learn how to use silence appropriately, by being shushed at various
times and places. 68 Speech ethnographers who inquire into "what
can be said when, where, by whom, to whom, in what manner, and in
what circumstances... also consider who may not speak.
69
In a recent work, Robin Patric Clair, a communication theorist,
surveys previous book-length studies of silence as well as the contri-
butions of feminist scholars to the understanding of gendered
silence.70 Clair then examines the ways in which marginalized groups
are not only silenced by the dominant culture but also participate in
the silencing of other marginalized peoples]' Clair uses sexual har-
assment narratives from the workplace and the university milieu to
64. See id. at 681 n.2. These meanings were found to be consistent for both Japanese
and Americans. See id. at 687.
65. See Christopher Lynwood Shultis, Silencing the Sounded Self. John Cage and the Ex-
perimental Tradition in Twentieth Century American Poetry and Music 98 (1993) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico); see generally Gis0le Brelet, Music and Silence, in
REFLECTIONS ON ART: A SOURCE BOOK OF WRITINGS BY ARTISTS, CRITICS, AND PHILOSO-
PHERS (Susanne K. Langer ed., 1961).
66. See Brelet, supra note 66, at 23.
67. Id.
68. See Saville-Troike, supra note 48, at 11.
69. Id. at 13. •
70. See generally ROBIN PATRIC CLAIR, ORGANIZING SILENCE: A WORLD OF POSSIBILI-
TIES (1998).
71. See id.
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show how individual, collective, and institutional responses
can contribute to what she calls the "organization of
silence. 72 This phrase is intended to have Gramscian overtones
because she is referring "to the ways in which interests, issues and
identities of marginalized people are silenced and to how those
silenced voices can be organized in ways to be heard."73 Clair's
work draws on the work of many feminists who have used silence as
emblematic of women's oppression, such as Catherine A. MacKin-
non,74 as well as those, such as Mary Daly,'75 Tillie Olsen,76 Adrienne• 7771
Rich , and Audre Lord,8 who have addressed silence as a central
topic in their explorations of sexism and patriarchy.
72. Clair uses Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony to examine how sexual har-
assment narratives are framed in order to appeal to and support the perceptions and
interests of those with institutional power derived from gender, racial, and economic in-
equalites and disparities. See id. at 73-98. She examines the practices of universities in handling
sexual harassment complaints through "say no," "keep a record," and "report it" policies and
characterizes them as a process of bureaucratization, commodification, and privitization. Id.
at 99-121. She also uses the story of one man's sexual harassment incident to explore issues
of resistance and oppression as "self-contained opposites." Id. at 127-34.
73. Id. at 187. Because Gramsci's work on hegemony is referred to by LatCrit theorists,
I offer this extended quote explaining the concept:
According to Gramsci, in order for the dominant group to control the masses both
coercion and hegemony are required. No dominant group can rely entirely on coer-
cion. For if the dominant group uses physical force and threats of death or other
punitive measures as its sole means of control, it will expend huge amounts of time
and energy in the control process. Furthermore, complete control through coercion
is more likely to lead to resistance through revolution or rebellion because coerced
people have little to lose. Eventually, systems of control become "normalized" into
everyday practices, which are regulated through institutions such as the family, edu-
cation, religion, systems of law and law enforcement, medicine, and general
administration. These systems guarantee, "relations of domination and effects of he-
gemony.
Id. at 47. (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
141 (1979)).
74. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 3 (1993) (describing women's suf-
fering and pain, abuse, and terror as "unspeakable").
75. See MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER 93 (1973) (referring to two kinds of
gendered silence: 1) over women's achievements in a patriarchy-controlled history; and 2)
over the "arguments for and evidence of the matriarchal period").
76. See TILLIE OLSEN, SILENCES (1978).
77. See ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966-1978
(1979).
78. See AUDRE LORD, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984).
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B. Silence and Silencing: Cross-Cultural Meanings
It is not the case that the man who is silent says nothing.79
Communication can be difficult even among persons with a
common language and similar backgrounds and worldviews.
Words have multiple meanings, and intonations and gestures can
contribute to the ambiguity of expressive speech. To this complex-
ity we can add silence; it is, in and of itself, ambiguous. s°
Deborah Tannen has analyzed the negative value of silence, es-
pecially when it is being misinterpreted and misjudged by persons
from different cultural traditions.8 ' After studying the speech pat-
terns of New Yorkers (and New York Jews in particular) ,2 she
described their conversational style as fast talkers or "crowders.
'8 3
Fast talkers are associated with interrupting and making others feel
upset, dissatisfied, or incompetent. 4 But fast talkers can also
feel uncomfortable because the speech of slow talkers is punctu-
ated with pauses, which fast talkers experience as rude silences
that break the pace of the conversation. Conversation is a process
of taking turns and can be disrupted when the participants are un-
accustomed to the other's use of silence. 6 The fast talker can be
confused about whether the slow talker is silent or merely pausing
before continuing, and the slow talker can end up feeling
cramped. 7 Tannen offers the following example: "Teachers, for ex-
ample, know the problem of determining whether a student who
has been called on is pausing because s/he doesn't know the answer
79. K.H. Basso, 'To Give Up on Words: Silence in Western Apache Culture, in LANGUAGE
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 67 (Pier Paolo Giglioli ed., 1972) (citing an Apache maxim).
80. SeeJAwORSKI, supra note 27, at 69. Jaworski explains that some scholars have tried
contextual explanations for the meanings of silence while others have used a taxonomic
approach, "providing more or less elaborate lists of possible meanings and functions of
silence." Id. at 69-70 (citing seven scholars who have used a taxonomic approach).
81. See Deborah Tannen, Silence: Anything But, in PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE, supra note
47, at 93-109.
82. In addition to the Variations in silence, Tannen identified their particular conver-
sational style as having these characteristics: fast rate of speech; fast rate of turntaking;
persistence (i.e., if a linguistic turn is not acknowledged, try again); marked shifts in pitch;
marked shifts in amplitude; preference for storytelling; preference for personal stories;
tolerance of and preferences for simultaneous speech; and abrupt topic shifting. See id. at
102.
83. See id. at 106.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 106-09.
86. See id. at 108.
87. See id. at 106-09.
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(silence as omission of something), or because s/he is formulating
the answer (silence representing underlying action) .,,s
Tannen indicates that the speed of conversational pacing is rela-
tive and has meaning only with reference to expectations that are
largely culturally based. 9 So the negative valuation of the slow
talker is based on the fast talker's perception that s/he has nothing
to say or is unwilling to speak, while the fast talker gives the slow
talker the impression of crowding out others.90
Indigenous Peoples9 ' have been identified as one group having a
greater tendency towards silence than the dominant Euro-American
norm.92 This image has been formed both through the studies of
linguists and ethnographers as well as through widespread stereo-
types and caricatures (the "silent Indian") propagated by the
media.93 Consider the following:
[I] t is the coupling of topic control and turn exchange that is
largely responsible for the negative stereotypes held by non-
Indians of Athabaskans]. We hear people say that Athabas-
kans are 'passive', 'sullen', 'withdrawn', 'unresponsive', 'lazy',
'backward', 'destructive', 'hostile', 'uncooperative', 'anti-
social', and 'stupid'. And these are not just the attributions of
ignorant bigots. Hippler, Boyer, and Boyer (1978) make these
same attributions in a professional article on ethnopsychiatry
... What the 'Silent Indian' sees on the other side of the in-
teraction I cannQt say from my own experience, but what we
hear on our tapes is an almost breathless rush of talking at
them.94
One of the best known studies of silence in Native communities
was published by Keith H. Basso in 1972. 95 Basso began by ac-
knowledging the popular image of Indigenous Peoples (or the
88. Id. at 107.
89. See id. at 109 (stating that "fast" or "slow" speech means faster or slower than ex-
pected, and that the expectation of the conversation speed varies by culture).
90. See id.
91. In this paper I use the collective term Indigenous Peoples or the adjective Indige-
nous to refer to Native Americans, American Indians, and Canadian First Nations Peoples.
92. See DEVITO, supra note 55, at 245.
93. See Ron Scollon, The Machine Stops: Silence in the Metaphor of Malfunction, in
PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE, supra note 47, at 21, 24 (citing Arthur E. Hippler et al., Tana-
ina Ethnopsychiaty, Past and Present: A Reflection of Cultural Personality Dynamics, 15
INTERNORD 117 (1978)).
94. Id.
95. Basso, supra note 79.
[VOL. 5:847
SPRING 20001 Silence and Silencing 281
American Indian, in his terms) as having a "strong predilection for
keeping silent."96 Such impressions were based on popular litera-
ture, which describes American Indian culture as having an
"instinctive dignity," "an impoverished language," or a "lack of per-
sonal warmth. 9 7 Basso's research hypothesized that silence was
deployed by Apaches in response to uncertainty and unpredictabil-
ity in social situations.98 Specifically, Basso found that Apaches were
likely to remain silent when meeting strangers, 99 during the early
stages of courting, '00 upon the return of children from boarding
schools,'' when receiving criticism,' 0 2 and during periods of be-
reavement.0 3 Basso hypothesizes that silence is contextual and will
be used at different times depending on the social roles of the per-
sons involved in the communication and their status in relation to
each other.0 4 Basso concludes the article with reference to similar
interpretations of the use of silence among the Navajo."0
An extensive analysis of the use of silence among the Navajo has
been done in the context of Peacemaking, their well-established
system of traditional dispute resolution. 06 The author found that
there were consistently different interpretations given to silence by
Navajos and by non-Navajos. Navajos used silence, aware of the
"power of words," while non-Navajos were likely to conclude that
silence signaled a breakdown in the interaction. 1
7
The novelist/poet/screen writer Sherman Alexie, a Spokane/
Coeur d'Alene Indian, has also incorporated silence into his writ-
ing, going so far as to specify the length of the silences. His short
story, "Dear John Wayne,'"" is a fictive (and hilarious) colloquy
between a 118-year-old Spokane woman and a cultural anthro-
pologist from Harvard with a specialty in "mid- to late-twentieth-
century Native American culture, most specifically the Interior
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 83.
99. See id. at 71.
100. See id. at 73.
101. Seeid. at 74.
102. See id. at 77.
103. See id. at 78.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 84.
106. See Leslie P. Fagre, Cross-cultural Uses and Meanings of Silence in Peacemaking
Mediation in the Navajo Peacemaker Court and the Metro Court Mediation Program
(1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the MichiganJournal of Race & Law).
107. See id. at vi.
108. See SHERMAN ALEXIE, THE TOUGHEST INDIAN IN THE WORLD 189 (2000).
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Salish tribes of Washington State."10 9 Alexie has the Harvard
anthropologist in a knot about whether his "informant" is telling
him the truth about having lost her virginity to John Wayne. °10 In-
triguingly, Alexie uses parentheticals to specify the silences at
several points in the conversation (e.g., twenty-seven seconds of
silence, thirty-two seconds of silence, ten seconds of
silence, etc.)."' The reader is pulled into a reality in which silence
is so important that both the author and his reader must attend to
it.
Silence and silencing has been used adroitly by First Nations
Peoples in Canada and by other Indigenous writers in resisting the
persistent effects of the colonization of language, meaning, and
communication strategies.1 12 Living in and with the silencing of
genocide and epistemicide-the killing of indigenous knowledge
and languages-Indigenous writers are now writing silence into
their texts as a way of "eluding the problem of colonial mimicry"
3
... by reconfigur[ing] colonial language and discourse and re-
present[ing] English."1 4 In an extended analysis of silence as a fea-
ture of Indigenous verbal and written communication, and the
condition of being silenced as a result of the colonization process,
the literary critic Dee Horne uses the book Silent Words by Ruby
Slipperjack as illustrative of a narrative that "affirms First Nations
and offers readers an alternative discourse and a pedagogy of si-
lences."
1 1
5
Drawing on Homi Bhabha's concept of the "third space,,l6
Horne posits that colonized peoples can produce hybrid
109. Id. at 190.
110. Seeid.at 192.
111. Seeid. at i89-90, 192-94,195.
112. See generally DEE HORNE, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN INDIAN WRITING: UNSETTLING
LITERATURE (1999).
113. Mimicry has received considerable attention from post-colonial scholars, such as
Homi Bhabha and Edward Said. See HORNE, supra note 112, at 3 (explaining that "[t]he
colonial mimic who attempts to repeat colonizers is actually engaged in a re-presentation of
them wherein the colonial mimic is still disavowed as other, as different from the colo-
nizer").
114. Id. at 52. Home writes, "The subtitle of my book alludes to the way in which []
writers are unsettling (both in the sense of subverting and in the sense of decolonizing)
mainstream literature. An underlying premise is that, although American Indians have
undergone imperialism and neocolonialism, they are still being colonized." Id.; see also id. at
xvii. (explaining that "although American Indians have undergone imperialism and neoco-
lonialism, they are still being colonized."). I would like to express my gratitude to my
colleague Kip Bobroff for providing me with this and other sources on Indigenous silence.
115. Id.at53.
116. Homi Bhabha's concept of hybridity, or a "third space," creates "the hybrid mo-
ment of political change. Here the transformational value of change lies in the re-
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texts." 7 These hybrid texts "challenge the colonial discourse with-
out perpetuating it""" and "achieve a genuinely transformative and
interventionist criticism of post-colonial reality."" 9 Horne explains:
Slipperjack creates a hybrid form of writing in which she
writes in English to critique the written as well as the spoken
English of colonizers, yet uses implicature to foreground Ojib-
way pedagogy. Further, she conveys Ojibway traditions not
only through but also between the silent words of print. I am
using implicature to refer to the implied meanings, the unspo-
ken words and feelings between the lines of print. I am also
drawing on Adam Jaworski's definition in which he writes that
implicature is the "unsaid elements of the utterance." In Silent
Words the unsaid utterances often include unsaid, but im-
plied, Ojibway traditions.
20
The silence of Indigenous women in Mexico has been a major
topic of study for Lourdes Arizpe, a Mexican social scientist. 2' She
notes that campesinas [peasant women] are reduced to caricatures,
and that the homogenizing label of Indian "erase Is] their linguistic
and cultural identities by lumping them all in the same category.' 2 2
In the mid-1980's (the period about which she writes) Arizpe claims
that in Mexico, unlike in Africa and Asia, the dislocation of persons
from the provinces to the cities was predominantly female. 12 3 The
great majority of these young women (70%) moved to the cities to
work in service positions, often as domestic laborers.' 24 These
women have been multiply marginalized-through the disruptions
of the colonial process and its divestiture of the lands of indige-
nous peoples-up to the contemporary exploitation caused by an
articulation, or translation, of elements that are neither the One... nor the Other... but some-
thing else besides, which contests the terms and territories of both." Id. at xix (quoting from
HoMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 28 (1994)).
117. Horne problematizes the notion of hybridity by acknowledging its connections to
assimilation. "Nonetheless, hybridization need not be assimilation-one culture dominating
and taking over another culture-but can be a recognition of the interactions between
cultures." Id. at xvii-xviii.
118. Id. at xix.
119. Id. (citing BILL ASHCROFT, ET AL., THE EMPIRE WRITES BACK: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE IN POST-COLONIAL LITERATURES 180 (1989)).
120. Id. at 54.
121. See Lourdes Arizpe, Peasant Women and Silence, in WOMEN'S WRITING IN LATIN
AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY (Sara Castro-Klarhn et al. eds., 1991).
122 Id. at 335.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 336.
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enduring agricultural crisis and an uneven pattern of industrial
development. 25 Warning against assuming that peasant women will
conceive of their oppression in terms that are similar to those of
women in "rational, individualized Western culture,"26 Arizpe
nonetheless asserts that "violence can be named in a thousand
different languages, but it is still violence ... [and] breaking the
silence is the first step. 127
Chicana literary critics, such as Tey Diana Rebolledo, and the
writers they analyze have identified silence and voice as central
topics in Chicana literature. 28 In ways that are at once similar to
and different from the conditions of Mexican campesinas, Chicanas
attribute their silence to the experience of colonization, including
the religiously inspired sexual guilt of Catholicism, the patriarchal
tensions in the family sphere, and the widespread lack of opportu-
nity for education or non-exploitative employment. 29 Rebolledo
posits that Chicanas form their identities through their writing by
placing themselves within historical and political events that have
implications for the Chicano/a community.
3 0
In Delia's Song, Lucha Corpi uses the Third World Strike at the
University of California at Berkeley as the setting for her narrative.
Rebolledo writes, "Having come from a traditional Mexican
American family to Berkeley in the tumultuous late 1960s, Delia
seeks understanding of her role in the strike, and through this un-
derstanding, she is able to achieve the power to give herself her
own shape, to control her own identity. '1' Corpi describes the
process of being silenced and coming, fearfully, to voice and writing:
I learned silence, painfully, slowly, as one learns to write, stroke
by stroke until the letters' form and sound is etched on the
whiteness of the paper, and voice uncovers its reason for being.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 338.
127. Id.
128. See INFINITE DIVSIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CHICANA LITERATURE (Tey Diana Re-
bolledo & Eliana S. Rivero eds., 1993); LATINA: WOMEN'S VOICES FROM THE BORDERLANDS,
(Lillian Castillo-Speed ed., 1995); IN OTHER WORDS: LITERATURE BY LATINAS OF THE
UNITED STATES (Roberta Fernandez ed., 1994); BREAKING BOUNDARIES: LATINA WRITING
AND CRITICAL READINGS (Asunci6n Horno-Delgado et al. eds., 1989).
129. See, e.g., INFINITE DIVISIONS, supra note 128, at 1-35 (outlining the history, tradi-
tion of, and inspiration for Chicana literature).
130. See id.
131. TEY DIANA REBOLLEDO, WOMEN SINGING IN THE SNOW: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF
CHICANA LITERATURE 121 (1995); see also Marta Ester S.nchez, Setting the Context: Gender,
Ethnicity, and Silence in Contemporary Chicana Poetry, in CONTEMPORARY CHICANA POETRY: A
CRITICAL APPROACH TO AN EMERGING LITERATURE 1, 1 (1985) (setting Chicana literature in
a social and historical context).
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Silence then is simply the pause between words, the breath that
keeps them alive, the secret element that spans the territory be-
tween them.
I have feared you so, Silence, my oldest enemy, my dearest
friend. I surrendered my tongue to you once, freely, and I
learned your secret. I learned to write.',2
Maria Herrera-Sobek echoes a similar theme in "Silent Scream:"
There is
So much pain
Inside our throats
We are afraid
That if we speak
We'll yell
We'll shriek
We'll moan
We'll scream
We'll cry
And so
We stay
Quiiiiiiiet. 133
Chicana writers such as Corpi and Herrera-Sobek have focused on
the forced silencing experienced by some women. Another
prominent Chicana writer, Gloria Anzalddia, has written both
about this type of gendered silencing as well as the opprobrium
expressed toward Chicana girls and women who do speak up. Few
authors write as elegantly as Anzaldfia, with her weaving together
of Spanish and English, prose and poetry, the words of la nifia
buena and those of jotos and machas1 3 4 This is nothing short of her
132. REBOLLEDO, supra note 131, at 123 (quoting LUCHA CORPI, DELIA'S SONG 150
(1995)). For a different construction of learned silence through the loss of language, the
attenuation of family ties, and the harboring of secrets, see Richard Rodriguez, Aria, in
HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ 11 (1981). In his subse-
quent memoir, a more nuanced book, Rodriguez remembers an incident concerning his
own prejudices about silence. He is challenged by three Asian students in his Freshman
English course at Berkeley: "We think, Mr. Rodriguez, that you are prejudiced against Asian
students. Because we do not speak in class." Rodriguez admits, "I did have a bias, an inevit-
able American bias, that favored the talkative student." RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, DAYS OF
OBLIGATION: AN ARGUMENT WITH MY MEXICAN FATHER 173 (1992).
133. Maria Herrera-Sobek, Silent Scream, quoted in REBOLLEDO, supra note 128, at 123.
134. Translation: words of"good girls" and those of "gays" and "dykes."
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invention of a hybrid language for m .stizaje'1'/a hybrid language for
the practice of hybridity.13 Anzaldila mourns the loss of language, cul-
ture, and land; the loss is coupled with the imposition of
heterosexuality, "unaccented" English, and a tradition of stifling
silence in the Mexicano/Chicano culture of the Borderlands.
13 7
"[Hiablar pa' 'tras, repelar. Hocicona, repelona, chismosa; having a big
mouth, questioning, carrying tales are all signs of being mal criada.
In my culture they are all words that are derogatory if applied to
women-I have never heard them applied to men.
Anzaldfia's words jerk me back into childhood memories. I am about
eight years old; my sister Maria Elena is seven. Our neighbor, Don Archibe-
que, has nicknames for us. Marl he calls "brinca-charcos;" by "puddle-
jumper" I understand him to mean that she is Tomboyish, more active than
little Chicanitas should be. He calls me "sabelo-todo" or "know-it-all. " My
childish exuberance is bruised by his words. I know he is chiding me not
only for acting too smart but more importantly for not knowing my place as
a girl, for talking too much, for not holding my tongue.
But lessons like these are hard-wired into us, and they are not easily un-
learned. I hear the words that once crushed my spirits spill out of my
mouth. I hear myself chiding my daughter, irrationally angry at her for
being too much like me. "Sabelo-todo, " I hear myself say. You would think
that I would know better. You would think that the memory of my being
silenced as a child for not being sufficiently girlish would now silence me as
an adult woman so that the cycle does not reproduce itself
This reverie prompted by Alzaldtia's writing involves one of
those linguistic fissures experienced by persons who live between
two cultures. Living between two cultures often has the sensation
of a slippage in vocabularies, meanings, and experiences. Asian
Pacific American women have written about this feeling, some-
times describing it as being at a "loss of words."1 39 Zhong Xueping,
born and raised in Shanghai but educated in the United States and
now a professor at Tufts University, was a delegate to the Fourth
135. Mestizaje is the Spanish word for hybridity, referring to racial mixing or miscegena-
tion. The word has become a metaphor for cultural and disciplinary syncretism evident in
the writing of many Chicano/a writers and scholars.
136. See generally RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL
ANALYSIS 216-17 (1989).
137. See ANZALDJA, How to Tame a Wild Tongue, in BORDERLANDS/la frontera: THE NEW
MESTIZA 53 (1987).
138. Id. As Gloria Anzaldtia often writes without translating, and this Article honors her
decision not to do so.
139. Roundtable on the Fourth World Conference on Women and the NGO Forum, 1995, in
CHINESE WOMEN TRAVERSING DIASPORA, supra note 13, at 240.
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World Conference on Women in Beijing.1 40 In describing reunions
with relatives after prolonged separations, Zhong reminisces about
the misconceptions her relatives and the local people had about a
women's conference and her participation in it. 14 The rumors that
were circulating suggested that the international meeting was
bringing dangerous elements into China, but any attempt to ex-
plain that the meeting was organized to discuss women's issues
reduced it to a meeting dealing with trivial matters. 42 Thus, the
two formulations that were available to her to explain what she was
doing visiting China as an academic from the United States would
be understood either as "dangerous foreign elements" or "trivial
women's matters."4 3 Zhong reflects on the ambiguities of communi-
cation and the wisdom of silent self-interrogations as she ponders
her loss of words:
Maybe feeling speechless is a normal reaction in these situa-
tions. Why should I have felt the impulse to explain? Should I
have tried harder? Do I necessarily know any better? ... I may
have more access to information than these people [her aunt
and other local people], but do I know better simply because
I have access to certain knowledge? These may be rhetorical
questions echoing some of the debate familiar to us in the
United States, but my wondering did keep my mouth shut
and my ears open when in China and continues to keep me
"sober" when I speak. 44
Professor Margaret Chon, reviewing Sharon Hom's book and cit-
ing to the previous quote, refers to this slippage in language and
meaning by observing that "silence is a response to discursive an-
tagonisms created by being between two or more cultural
positions.'
145
The foregoing analyses are presented in order to show the dif-
ferences and similarities among women of color, especially
among those who share the relative privilege of the academic
140. Seeid. at211.
141. See id. at 238-40.
142. See id. at 239.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 240.
145. Margaret Chon, Being Between: A Review Essay of Chinese Women Traversing Diaspora:
Memoirs, Essays, and Poetry, 17 Loy.. OF L. A. ENT. L.J. 571, 574 (1997) (Professor Chon ad-
mits the challenge to her identity as an Asian American woman lawyer that these stories
about the diasporic experience represent with their disruptions of language, identity, locus,
and epistemology.).
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life. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that silence and
the condition of being silenced as a woman is an experience that is
universally shared by women of color, bell hooks is a notable
example of a writer who has taken issue with this construct of gen-
dered silence. She explains,
[I]n black communities (and diverse ethnic communities),
women have not been silent. Their voices can be heard. Cer-
tainly for black women, our struggle has not been to emerge
from silence into speech but to change the nature and direc-
tion of our speech, to make a speech that compels listeners,
one that is heard.
146
Hooks writes about the need for defiance and resistance in the
speech of Black women. She found her strength in first "talking
back" as a child, seeing youthful courage as the seed for the in-
domitability of spirit that writing as an independent thinker would
require.
4
C. Silence as Cultural Expression and Silencing as Cultural Suppression
or Silence as Racial Marker and Silencing as Racial Privilege
[T]he removal of the last two Latino jurors for what in the
end is simply their proficiency in the Spanish language,
should not be sanctioned.
14
As mentioned at the beginning of this Article, both Race Crits
and LatCrits have done extensive work on language-based dis-
crimination. 149 Building on this previous work, I assert that
nonverbal components of communication, including silence, pro-
vide the basis on which Latinos and other non-English speakers are
racially categorized and subjected to ill treatment. The Hernandez
case, described below, is a particularly overt example of what I as-
sert is a misinterpretation of linguistic minorities' intended
146. bell hooks, Talking Back, in ANZALDUA, MAKING FACES, supra note 11, at 207, 207-
08.
147. See id.; Cf Audre Lorde, The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action in
SISTER OUTSIDER 40, 41(1984) (Facing cancer, she writes, "death ... the final silence ...
might be coming quickly... without regard to whether... I had only betrayed myself into
small silences.").
148. People v. Hernandez, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 93 (1990) (Kaye,J., dissenting).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 2-10.
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communications, with discriminatory consequences for both the
potential jurors in the case and more generally for linguistic mi-
norities. I believe this type of miscommunication and misreading
of silence is frequent and contributes to the stereotyping of lin-
guistic minorities, given the widespread misunderstanding of the
meaning of silence, pausing, and hesitations in the speech patterns
of non-English speaking communities.
In describing what happens when Whites hear the languages of
people of color, I am drawing liberally from the discursive and
epistemological model employed by the Canadian sociologist
Sherene Razack, who critically examines what happens when
Whites look at people of color. 5 Razack exhorts us
[To] ask[] questions about how relations of domination and
subordination stubbornly regulate encounters in classrooms
and courtrooms .... We need to direct our efforts to the con-
ditions of communication and knowledge production that
prevail, calculating... who can speak and how they are likely
to be heard. .... ""
Razack argues that this imperial gaze, this frame for seeing the
world, is deeply connected to the identity of the colonizers and
their sense of superiority. 52 I am making a related argument with
respect to the identifying characteristics of the languages of peo-
ple of color. The silences, pauses, and hesitations that punctuate
their verbal sounds function as audible markers of race and eth-
nicity. In the Hernandez case the pauses and hesitations are the
linguistic characteristics that allowed the prosecutor to dismiss
the Latinos from the juror pool. 53 When, as in this instance, si-
lence functions as a racial marker for Latinos, the right to silence
Latinos functions as racial privilegie for the prosecutor. The
prosecutor arrogated to himself, with the eventual sanction of
the state and federal courts of appeal, the right to interpret the
Latinos' silence as contradicting their spoken words. I contend
that this act of withdrawing civic rights because of Latinos' lin-
guistic differences is racial privilege and an act of racial
subordination.
150. See SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND
CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS (1998).
151. Id. at 10.
152. See id.
153. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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1. Dionisio Hernandez v. New York
a. The Supreme Court decision-The case of Hernandez v. New York
came before the Supreme Court on appeal from the New York
Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the defendant's conviction
on two counts of attempted murder and criminal possession of a
weapon.' Defendant challenged the conviction on the basis of
Batson v. Kentucky 55 as a violation of his equal protection rights be-
cause the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude
Latinos from the jury. The Court affirmed the judgment of the
New York state courts and held that the prosecutor had offered
race-neutral explanations for excluding the Latinos from jury serv-
ice. 5' To quote Justice Kennedy, "the prosecutor did not rely on
language ability without more, but explained that the specific re-
sponses and the demeanor of the two individuals during voir dire
caused him to doubt their ability to defer to the official translation
of Spanish-language testimony.'
5 7
What follows is an analysis of what the Court was referring to as
"demeanor." I argue that the prosecutor was interpreting the hesi-
tancy on the part of the potential jurors-their pausing before
speaking, their silence-in a manner that was consistent with his
worldview. Indeed, I think the prosecutor did not know enough
about nonverbal communication, particularly cross-cultural com-
munication, to understand that silence, pauses, and hesitations are
encoded with meaning in relation to the words and the language
being spoken. I further assert that silence with its multiple mean-
ings is an unexplored aspect of linguistic discrimination.
The point is that the prosecutor lacked the information to know
what the Latino jurors meant by their silence; after all, they were
never asked about it. I do not claim to know with any exactness
what they were communicating nonverbally. What I am question-
ing, however, is the unequivocal certainty with which the
prosecutor drew his conclusion.
b. The Facts in Hernandez v. New York-On a fateful day in
1987, Dionisio Hernandez fired several gun shots at his girlfriend,
Charlene Calloway, and her mother, Ada Saline."5 Three shots
154 See id. at 355.
155. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (requiring a three-step inquiry into claims that a prosecutor has
used peremptory challenges in a constitutionally discriminatory manner).
156. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352.
157. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
158. See id. at 355.
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struck Ms. Calloway."5 In aiming at her mother, Hernandez instead
hit two men who were in a nearby restaurant. ° All of the victims
survived. 
61
At trial, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to
dismiss four potential jurors, who constituted all of the panel
members who were Hispanic (although the prosecutor was uncer-
tain whether one who was surnamed Mikus was Hispanic). 62 The
prosecutor, in volunteering his reasons, explained:
I felt that from their answers they would be hard pressed to
accept what the interpreter said as the final thing on what the
record would be, and I even had to ask the Judge to question
them on that, and their answers were-I thought they both
indicated that they would have trouble, although their final
answer was they could do it. I just felt from the hesitancy in their
answers and their lack of eye contact that they would not be
able to do it.
63
After extended discussions among the attorneys and the judge,
the trial court judge twice rejected the motion for a mistrial. On
appeal, the New York Court of Appeal, in a memorandum opin-
ion, affirmed the trial court's rejection of the defendant's Batson
claim on the ground that the prosecutor had provided race-neutral
reasons for his peremptory strikes sufficient to rebut the Latino
defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination. 164 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed, accepting the explanation from
the prosecutor that potential jurors Mikus and Gonzales'6" "each
had given him a basis to believe from words and actions that their
Spanish language fluency might create difficulties in their accept-
ing the official court interpreter's translation of the testimony of
the Spanish-speaking witnesses."
66
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 356.
163. Id. at 357 n. 1 (emphasis added). For a penetrating analysis of "how responses to
subordinate groups [including the cultural rules of eye contact] are socially organized to
sustain existing power arrangements," see RAZACK, supra note 150, at 10.
164. See People v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
165. There were four Latino jurors, two of whom, Mufioz and Rivera, were excused be-
cause both had brothers who had been prosecuted by the same District Attorney's office,
and there was thus a doubt that they could be unbiased. See New York v. Hernandez, 553
N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (1990).
166. Id. (emphasis added.)
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2. A Linguistic Contextualization-Many scholars have analyzed
the Hernandez case. I"' Some have focused on the discriminatory ef-
fects of this judicial opinion on bilingual, especially Spanish-
.• 168
speaking, individuals and communities. One scholar has cri-
tiqued this series of opinions from the point of view of cognitive
science and sociolinguisitics, arguing, inter alia, that it is not possi-
ble for a bilingual person to "put aside" one language in favor of
another. I6 Another scholar has focused on the importance of the
Hernandez case to an understanding of how nonverbal or de-
meanor testimony is used to assess credibility, both with respect to
potential jurors during voir dire and witnesses during trials, by
prosecutors, judges, and juries. I7
While I completely agree with the analysis about the bilingual
person's inability to turn off her understanding of a language in
which she is fluent, I want to emphasize a different aspect of the
communication that occurred between the potential jurors and
the prosecutor. Namely, I want to focus on the hesitancy, the si-
lence with which they responded and which the prosecutor
interpreted as an answer in the negative. The prosecutor is quoted
by the Court of Appeals as replying, "I didn't feel, when I asked
them whether or not they could accept the interpreter's transla-
tion of it, I didn't feel that they could. They each looked away from
me and said with some hesitancy that they would try... ,,i71 It must be
noted that the prosecutor decided not to believe the words of the
potential jurors who had assured him that they could accept the
official interpreter's version. Why then did the prosecutor disbe-
lieve their words and choose instead to give a particular meaning
to their demeanor, that is, their lack of eye contact and their hesi-
tancy?
167. See infra notes 168-70.
168. See Alfredo Mirande, 'Now That I Speak English, No Me Dejan Hablar ['I'm Not Allowed
to Speak']" The Implications of Hernandez v. New York 18 CHICANO L. Rv. 115 (1996); Andrew
McGuire, Peremptory Exclusion of Spanish-Speaking Jurors: Could Hernandez v. New York Happen
Here?, 23 N.M. L. REV. 467 (1993); Lisa J. Soto, The Treatment of the Spanish Language and
Latinos in Education in the Southwest, in the Workplace and in the Jury Selection Process, 3 His-
PANIC L.J. 73 (1997); Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of
Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L.REv. 1 (1992); Salvador Mendoza, Jr., When Maria Speaks Spanish:
Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit and the Fallacy of Race Neutrality, 18 CHICANO L.REv. 193 (1996).
169. See Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from
Jury Service, 1993 Wise. L. REv. 761.
170. See Sarah B. Clasby, Understanding Testimony: Official Translation and Bilingual Jurors
in Hernandez v. New York, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 515 (1991-92).
171. Hernandez, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 109, 118 (emphasis added).
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Linguists and legal scholars have studied many aspects of nonver-
bal communication, including kinesics (also called body language),
paralanguage (the sounds of oral language, such as pitch, tone, and
volume), and proxemics (the space between speakers and the
placement of such objects as chairs, desks, etc., to enhance the ef-
fectiveness of the communication). 7 2 In fact they contend that
most of the meaning-from sixty to more than ninety percent of a
communicated message-is contained in the nonverbal conduct of
the speaker.73 Despite the historical importance that has attached
to demeanor in the assessment of credibility, psychologists who
study deception conclude that credibility cannot be accurately de-
termined through nonverbal behavior.
174
The prosecutor dismissed the Latinos in the Hernandez case for
what he concluded was deception-namely, that their claim that
they could abide by the official interpretation of the Spanish testi-
mony was belied by their hesitancy in responding and their lack of
eye contact. 75 But if the above-mentioned social science research is
accepted, the Latinos' demeanor did not accurately reflect their
cognitive processes.
I do not contend, however, that the prosecutor should have
read the Latinos' lack of eye contact and their silence in the face of
his questioning as having no importance. To the contrary, given
the nexus of language and culture to race and especially the link
between performance and racial identities, I posit that such differ-
ences as the cultural rules about eye contact and silence are the
types of markers that denote racial boundaries. The Latinos were
172. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Smith, The Advocate's Use of Social Science Research into Nonverbal
and Verbal Communication: Zealous Advocacy or Unethical Conduct? 134 MIL. L. Rav. 173, 174-
76 (1991).
173. See id. at 174 n.2.
174. See Marcus Stone, Instant Lie Detection? Demeanour and Credibility in Criminal Trials,
1991 CRIM. L. REv. 821, 829 (1991) (Stone concludes that demeanor cannot be the basis for
assessing the credibility of witnesses. "There is no known physiological connection between
the brain processes of a lying person and any bodily or vocal signs .... Anxiety or relaxa-
tion, even if detected correctly, cannot be relied on to indicate veracity."); Olin Guy
Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1104 (1991) (After acknowledging how
entrenched the notion that jurors and judges can discern sincerity or deception is in legal
discourse, the author concludes that many experiments with thousands of subjects have
shown that people do not in fact have the capacity to detect falsehoods or errors by observ-
ing nonverbal behaviour.);Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The
Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1157, 1159
(1993) (arguing that extensive social scientific empirical research demonstrates that "typical
subjects are unable to use the 'manner and conduct' of a speaker to successfully detect
deceptive information on any reliable basis").
175. See infra text accompanying notes 178-79.
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explicitly "otherized"171 in this racialized incident and as a result of
this Batson inquiry.17 7 The prosecutor, joined by the judge and the
defense counsel, depended on a variety of racialized stimuli-their
last names and probably their somatic and sartorial appearances
(skin, hair color, and clothing styles), as well as how they sounded
through the Spanish they spoke and the nonverbal behaviors they
exhibited-to conclude that a racialized inquiry about their exclu-
sion as jurors was necessary. Their nonverbal behaviors, including
their silence, was one of the racial markers relied upon to catego-
rize them and then to exclude them as jurors.
The racial categorizing that occurred in that courtroom de-
pended not only on how Whites look at people of color but also how
Whites hear people of color. So that when Sherene Razack exhorts us
"to ask questions about how relations of domination and subordina-
tion stubbornly regulate encounters in courtrooms"7 8 and to "direct
our efforts to the conditions of communication and knowledge pro-
duction that prevail, calculating" who can speak and how they are
likely to be heard,7 9 she is connecting this conceptual frame relied
on by Whites, this way of seeing and hearing the world, to the racial
superiority that forms the identities of the dominant White majority.
This way of seeing and hearing the world-of not hearing the si-
lences of the Latinos as communicating anything other than what
the prosecutor said they meant-evidences the racial privilege of
the legal actors (including the prosecutor and the judges at trial
and in the subsequent appeals). In Bakhtinian terms, the prosecu-
tor and the judges imposed an interpretation on Latinos' silence
that had centripetal effects, eliminating the possibility for multiple
176. The notion of"otherizing" has been described in this way:
[A] kind of consensus has emerged that members of the dominant group-no mat-
ter how 'intimate' ... their sense of involvement with the people concerned, no
matter how deep their proposed interest in the subject-will represent nothing but
the assumption of their own kind ... [T]here will be a tendency, as James Clifford
put it, 'to dichotomize into we-they contrasts and to essentalize the restltant other .'
Mick Gidley, Representing Others: An Introduction, in REPRESENTING OTHERS: WHITE VIEWS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1, 2-3 (Mick Gidley ed., 1992).
177. Once a Batson challenge is invoked and the trial judge determines that there is a
good faith allegation by the defense counsel that the prosecutor has used race as a reason
for eliminating potential jurors, the prosecutor is required to come forward with race-
neutral explanations. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at 359-59. For this reason, such a col-
loquy is a clear example of a racialized incident, a moment in which race becomes the focus
of the judicial deliberations. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
178. RAZACK, supra note 150, at 10.
179. Id.
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(or heteroglossic) meanings to their silence. Consequently, if silence
was a racial marker for the Latinos, their silencing instantiated the
racial privilege of the dominant majority through the actions of the
prosecutor and the judges.
II. SILENCE AND SILENCING AND PEDAGOGICAL DISCOURSE
The first part of this Article attempts to develop an argument
that links silence to racial identities both in terms of how Whites
see and hear non-Whites and in terms of how people of color pres-
ent themselves to the world. Drawing on the work of sociolinguists
and other scholars, I have argued that one's use of silence is an
aspect of communication that, like accents, is related to one's cul-
ture and that, in some situations, may correlate with one's racial
identity. I build on this cross-cultural analysis of silence and silenc-
ing in this next section, linking the dimensions of silence and
silencing within cultural discourse with those of pedagogical dis-
course within the law school classroom.
A. Silence in the Law School Classroom
The answer lies in the complex nature of silence, itself. Si-
lence can signify nothing, or it can communicate a great deal,
all depending on context.
so
At different times during the academic year, I remind students
that the architecture and design elements of our law school mag-
nify some voices and silence others. I point out that the "well" at
180. Kaufman v. Sup. Ct. of Orange Cty., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
Irving Kanarek, Charles Manson's attorney, was sued by Jos6 and Hermalinda Rangel for
malpractice, fraud, and breach of contract. See id. at 266. He represented himself but then
ended up in a mental institution. See id. The Rangels' lawyers failed to inform the trial judge
about Kanarek's institutionalization and absence at the hearings. See id. The trial judge en-
tered a default judgment, and the lawyers proceeded to recover their fees from the Client
Security Fund of the California State Bar. See id. at 265. Later, Kanarek was released, and he
sued, alleging, inter alia, abuse of process. The Rangels' attorneys defended, saying that,
under California's litigation privilege protecting communications made in or out of court,
they had the right to remain silent about Kanarek's hospitalization. See id. The appellate
court overturned the trial judge, writing, "silence in the face of a duty ... communicated
something substantial." Id. at 269; see also Martin Paskind, The Question of Silence in Civil Law-
suits, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL,June 16, 1997, at 5.
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the front of the room, the podium, and the directional and raked
seating are all intended to give prominence to the professor's
voice. I note that even though the room is designed with a half-
circle seating arrangement, it is difficult for the students to talk
among themselves. Their bodies are oriented toward the front of
the room in order to see the eyes, hear the voice, and read the face
of the professor rather than those of the other students. I make
comparisons between the classroom and the courtroom, where
official hierarchy and deference is even more rigidly enforced than
in most classrooms; in courtrooms, silence is gaveled into existence
and maintained, like in churches, as part of the protocol of the
space.
I use this architectonic analysis to make us all aware of how si-
lence and voice are regulated in the law school classroom; we are
socialized to speak and not to speak at certain times and in certain
places. But silence is not experienced, understood, or used in the
same manner by all law professors and law students. We come into
the world of legal education with individual propensities toward
and different collectivized understandings and norms about si-
lence. To this context of personal experience, we add new
information and experiences about silence and our in/ability to
voice ourselves in legal spaces and legal discourses.
During the period from 1988 to 1992, feminists within the legal
academy wrote about silence as a persistent aspect of classroom
dynamics and the experience of feeling silenced reported by many
White women law students (and significant numbers of both male
and female students of color) .1 ' This scholarship prompted a
181. See Taunya Lovell Banks, GenderBias in the Classroom, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527 (1990);
Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988); Leslie G.
Espinoza, Constructing a Professional Ethic: Law School Lessons and Lesions, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 215 (1989-90); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted:
Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law Schools, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (1990); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal Education or "the Fem-
Crits Go to Law School, 38 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988); Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-
Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REv. 139 (1990); Judy Scales-Trent, Sameness and
Difference in a Law School Classroom: Working at the Crossroads, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 415
(1992);Janet Taber, et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study
of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209 (1988); Morrison Torrey,
Jackie Casey, & Darin Olson, Teaching Law in a Feminist Manner: A Commentary from Experi-
ence, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 87 (1990); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal
Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Class-
room Climate: Encouraging Student Involvement, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 326 (1989-90). For
one study that found no significant differences, however, between male and female student
satisfaction levels with the law school experience, see Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Gender, Legal
Education and Legal Careers, 41J. LEGAL EDUC. 443 (1991).
[VOL. 5:847
SPRING 2000] Silence and Silencing 297
number of panels at academic meetings that considered the issue
of silence in the classroom.8 2 Today there is wider acknowledge-
ment, among feminists and non-feminists, that many female
students (and male students of color) are reluctant to speak in the
classroom. 183 Several recent surveys have confirmed this, but there
seems also to be more acceptance of this reality and less current
scholarship aimed at naming, describing, and altering it.
I have found that the silence in the classroom has a different
feel once it is named for the students. Once I raise silence as a
topic and analyze silence as volitional, meaningful, and culturally
relative, I find that the students become more aware of silence and
occasionally deploy it as a communicative strategy. I occasionally
stand at the podium and hold silence while noting the time. The
first time I do this, I can feel the tension among the students. They
do not know what is expected of them; sometimes one of the more
gregarious students will begin talking. After I hold silence long
enough so that they have all "heard" it, I ask them to estimate how
long we have been quiet. Although I rarely hold silence longer
than fifteen seconds, their estimates are frequently double or triple
the time. I take the opportunity to teach about silence and to talk
about its cultural and linguistic characteristics. I discuss various
meanings of silence. For example, I explain that the pause before
one speaks can be of various lengths, and that longer pauses do
not necessarily mean that the speaker is waiting to be "saved" from
her muteness. I also mention devices such as implicature1 84 I ex-
plain that some students are prepared to answer quite rapidly
while others are slower in preparing a response. Despite the con-
ventional wisdom that overvalues quickness, I announce that I will
wait for those who do not think aloud and who need more time to
collect their thoughts before speaking. My purpose is to give those
who need more time the opportunity to pause and process their
thoughts without having to fear that they will be interrupted by
182. See, for example, the Classroom Climate Panel at the 20th National Conference
on Women and the Law, as well as a January 1991 workshop on law school curricula organ-
ized by the Women and the Law Project, American University, Washington College of Law.
183. See generally Lani Guinier, et al, Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994). There is also wider acceptance of the idea
that silence has a politics and that women have been systematically silenced. Jaworski notes
that women have used the following techniques to break their silence: "[t]hey introduce
into their writing elements of intuitive knowledge and associative thinking; they rely heavily
on the use of neologisms; and they rename old concepts, alter the meaning of words (often
based on their etymology), and alter syntax."JAwoRsKI, supra note 27, at 122.
184. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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those who are quicker to speak (the "crowders"). s5 I want to help
the students hear each others silences and defeat the tendency to
reach negative conclusions about pauses and hesitancy.
Once classroom silence is introduced as a pedagogical tech-
nique and concern, students are more able to interpret their own
silences, their meanings, and whether their silences are volitional.
I often have former and current students come talk to me about
the panic they are experiencing, their fears about speaking in
class, or their perception that they are not heard or that their si-
lences expose their failures. I have done practice sessions with
students in which we rehearse what they will say, sometimes by hav-
ing them ask for time to pause before answering: "Give me a
moment while I gather my thoughts."
Because verbal adroitness is so valued as evidence of legal abil-
ity, silence in the law school classroom can be menacing and
anxiety-producing for both teachers and students. Nonetheless,
teachers and students can become better communicators through
a greater understanding of silence. For those of us who are work-
ing under the aegis of LatCrit theory and praxis, creating learning
spaces where deeper dialogue from different points of view regu-
larly occurs is a pressing objective. If we are to disrupt the
centripetal forces of the dominant legal discourse, we must learn
new skills, new ways of thinking together. Silence can be such a
disruptive influence.
B. Silence in the Law School Classroom as Part of a
Freirean "Culture of Silence"
One of the most influential educational theorists of the late
Twentieth Century is Paulo Freire, a Brazilian teacher and writer.
Is6
He is widely known for his critique of what he termed "banking"
education." 7 This method of education considers students to be:
185. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
186. See PAULO FREIRE, EDUCATION FOR CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS (1973); PAULO FREiRE,
PEDAGOGY OF HOPE: RELIVING PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1995), PAULO FREIRE, PEDA-
GOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
187. See Tom Heaney, Issues in Freirean Pedagooy (visited May 12, 2000)
<http://nlu.nl.edu/ace/Resources/Documents/Freirelssues.html> (on file with The Michi-
gan Journal of Race & Law); Mark K. Smith, Paulo Freire and Informal Education (visited May
12, 2000) <http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-freir.htm> (on file with The Michigan Journal
of Race & Law).
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Passive learners receiv[ing] deposits of pre-selected, ready-
made knowledge. The learner's mind is seen as an empty
vault into which the riches of approved knowledge are placed.
This approach is also referred to as "digestive" ... educa-
tion.
188
Freire argued that schools supported the status quo by ignoring
racism, sexism, the exploitation of workers, and other forms of
oppression; blocked social change; and inhibited the development
of "conscientization," a learning process by which a person becomes
aware of oppression and how to become a part of a collective proc-
ess to resist oppression and change the world. 9 Freire observed
that traditional education functions to control the conduct of large
groups of people without "the overt force of a police state, [by
adapting] learners to kinder, gender controls: career choices
(specialization), authority (dependency) and the good life
(consumerism) ,'90
Freire also names and describes a "culture of silence:"
A characteristic [of] ... oppressed people in colonized coun-
tries, with significant parallels in highly developed countries.
Alienated and oppressed people are not heard by the domi-
nant members of their society [who] ... prescribe the words
to be spoken by the oppressed through control of the schools
[], thereby effectively silencing the people.9
By quoting the work of Paulo Freire in the context of an analysis of
the dynamics of the law school classroom, I am not drawing a sim-
plistic analogy between the conditions in the favelas of Brazil and
those in the elite environment of law schools in the United States.
There is, however, a similarity in the silencing of students, here
and there, that is connected to a hegemonic method of education
that is intended to produce students who are dedicated to the
maintenance of the status quo, even though that status quo is op-
pressive to them.
The pedagogical techniques that are utilized in the law school
classroom, which is designed architectonically and epistemologi-
cally to be hierarchical, have been repeatedly shown to alienate
188. Heaney, supra note 187.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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and silence students, especially students of color and women from
different backgrounds. Because of the effects of legal education,
law students have been described as "becom[ing] belligerent, hos-
tile, argumentative, and demanding"'92 and suffering from a high
level of clinical depression. 93 Another scholar with an explicitly
feminist perspective has observed that there is a quid pro quo in law
school: "you get a graduate degree in a relatively short period of
time[, and] ... the appearance of power. People will listen to what
you say. The system's reward in this bargain, if it has trained you
right, is that you won't say anything, really, or at least nothing
threatening to it."
194
This silencing in the law school classroom is centripetal in the
Bakhtinian sense because of the strong imposition of one right way
of thinking/speaking as lawyers. The notion of a legal heteroglossia, a
multiplicity in the meanings, formats, linguistic formulae, etc., is
virtually heretical. The law school classroom is characterized by its
silences and the overt silencing of anything that is not legal
orthodoxy. For the most part, current legal education is the same
as it was one hundred years ago when it was implemented by Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School: It still
depends on a limited set of materials-appellate opinions-that
are discussed in a certain manner-through the Socratic method,
using a purportedly objective, decidedly dispassionate, and
typically adversarial approach. Silence, particularly that of students
of color and women, can potentially have centrifugal effects in the
form of resistance to the oppressiveness of the indoctrination and
professionalization. But more often, silence is a form of self-
censoring, resulting in centripetal, or power-centering, effects.
C. Silence and Silencing in the Clinic: An Enactment
Silence, and waiting till people are ready to give information,
are also central to Aboriginal ways of seeking any substantial
information. 9"9
192. Espinoza, supra note 181, at 218.
193. See id.
194. Scales, supra note 181, at 140-41.
195. Diana Eades, Legal Recognition of Cultural Differences in Communication: The Case of
Robyn Kina, 16 LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 215, 218 (1996).
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Law professors, lawyers, and law students can benefit from learn-
ing to utilize silence when communicating in cross-cultural
relationships and settings. While there is very little research con-
cerning silence in the clinical scholarship produced in law schools,
silence and its connection to interpersonal skills in the health in-
dustry has received considerable attention.1
96
The use of silence in doctor-patient communications has been
widely studied, both in the treatment of somatic illnesses and psy-
chiatric conditions.' 7 This research can help us inquire into
analogous situations involving lawyers and clients. Some studies
report the lack of information disclosed to patients for their deci-
sion-making. For example, one study in a family practice clinic of a
teaching hospital examined the process by which women and their
doctors decided whether to perform pap smears. 19 The doctor's
authority and medical knowledge creates an asymmetrical power
relationship with the patient that can manifest itself in terms of
whether or when the woman undresses for the procedure or
whether she is referred to a specialist.' 99 Poor communication re-
sults in conflict between the female patient and her doctor,
conflict that is often negotiated through silence.2 0 This phenome-
non was also described in a historical study of the relationship
between doctors and patients.20 ' The author concludes:
The history of the physician-patient relationship from ancient
times to the present bears testimony to physicians' caring dedi-
cation to their patients' physical welfare. The same history, by
its account of the silence that has pervaded this relationship,
also bears testimony to physicians' inattention to their patients'
right and need to make their own decisions.... Challenging
the long-standing tradition of silence requires nothing less than
uprooting the prevailing authoritarian value and belief systems
202and replacing them with more egalitarian ones.
196. See infra notes 197-206.
197. See LEWIS BERNSTEIN & ROSALYN S. BERNSTEIN, INTERVIEWING: A GUIDE FOR
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 91 (3d ed. 1980); LUCILLE HOLLANDER BLUM, READING BETWEEN
THE LINES: DOCTOR-PATIENT COMMUNICATION (1972); Evelyn Liegner, The Silent Patient, 61
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW 229 (1974).
198. See Sue Fisher, Doctor-Patient Communication: A Social and Micro-Political Performance,
6 SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS 1 (1984).
199. See id. at 14, fig. 1.
200. Seeid. at 1.
201. SeeJAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 2 (1984).
202. Id. at 28.
SUMMER 2000] Silence and Silencing
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
302 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 33:3
More recently, the relationship between doctors and patients
has been changed by several forces, such as the rise of health con-
sumerism and health care marketing.0 3 These forces have been the
impetus for focusing on patient satisfaction, especially in light of
new research demonstrating that different types of communication
can produce positive clinical outcomes.0 4 Because of the accelerated
changes that have overtaken the medical profession, physicians have
had to become better communicators, and using silence has proven
to be a key technique that helps them interact effectively with their
patients. 2°5 Doctors report that taking more time with patients, lis-
tening to them, and learning to be quiet is as important to the
patients, especially those with life-threatening illnesses, as empathy
and care.2 06
Doctors are not the only professionals who could benefit from
utilizing silence in practices associated with empathy and care. The
efficacy of using silence when lawyers are interviewing clients from
indigenous or aboriginal cultures has been analyzed by Diana
Eades, an Australian socio-linguist. 2°7 She was responsible for
groundbreaking work in the case of The Queen v. Robyn Bella
2081Kina, in which the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeals ac-
cepted socio-linguistic evidence and established the necessity of
having cultural differences in communication accommodated in
the representation of linguistic minorities.2 9
According to an account by Eades, Robyn Kina was charged with
the murder of her male partner of several years. ° She was repre-
sented by lawyers from the Legal Aid Commission and Aboriginal
Legal Services, government run legal offices that are grossly under-
staffed.21' In the period of eight months before her trial, she was
interviewed by six different solicitors or barristers.2 2 She pleaded
not guilty but was convicted in one of the shortest murder trials in
203. SeeJamesJ. Hughes, Organization and Information at the Bed-Side: The Experi-
ence of the Medical Division of Labor by Hospital Inpatients 5-6 (1994) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author).
204. See id.
205. See MARGARET GERTEIS ET AL., THROUGH THE PATIENT'S EYES: UNDERSTANDING
AND PROMOTING PATIENT-CENTERED CARE (1993).
206. See id.
207. See Eades, supra note 195, at 215.
208. See Queensland Court of Appeal, 29.11.93 (No. 221) (unreported).
209. See id.
210 SeeEades, supranote 195, at 216.
211. See id.
212. See id.
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Queensland history, requiring only three hours of evidence and
fifty minutes ofjury deliberations. 3
Years later, her case became the subject of considerable public
interest when she was featured on a television special on victims of
domestic abuse who kill their violent partners.214 Her story came to
light because the interview techniques employed by journalists
were different from those used by her lawyers.2 ' Eades analyzed
the interactions in this way:
In 1988 Kina was communicating in an Aboriginal way. The
lawyers who interviewed her were not able to communicate in
this way, and they were not aware that their difficulties in
communicating with her involved serious cultural differences
.... The way that lawyers are trained and the way they gener-
ally interview clients is not conducive to Aboriginal ways of
communicating. On the other hand, the way that the TV
journalists and the counselor communicated with Kina was
quite similar, as it happens, to Aboriginal ways of communi-
cating. 
16
The following summary accounts for the way that Aboriginal peo-
ple seek information:
... [I]n situations where Aboriginal people want to find out
what they consider to be significant or certain personal in-
formation, they do not use direct questions. It is important
for Aboriginal people to respect the privacy of others, and not
to embarrass someone by putting them 'on the spot.' People
volunteer some of their own information, hinting about what
they are trying to find out about. Information is sought as
part of a two-way exchange. Silence, and waiting till people
are ready to give information, are also central to Aboriginal
ways of seeking any substantial information.
Although we can recognise these ways of seeking information
in Standard English, we use them in mainstream society only
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 217.
216. Id.
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in sensitive situations. In Aboriginal interactions these are the
everyday strategies used to seek substantial information."7
The story that eventually emerged was that Kina had been the
victim of years of physical abuse, including hair pulling, kicking,
and anal rape."" On the day of the murder, her partner threatened
to rape her fourteen-year-old niece.2 9 When he lunged at Kina
with a chair over his head, she stabbed him once in the chest.22 0 He
staggered back, fell, and died shortly after. 1 A successful appeal
222was subsequently initiated by the Attorney General .
While Diana Eades' work involved the highly differentiated con-
text of Australian aboriginal persons being represented by White,
English-monolingual lawyers, some of the lessons derived from
that situation are equally applicable in the United States and of
benefit to both Whites and non-Whites, as well as to bilingual
lawyers and law students. The clinical skills of client interviewing
and counseling can be improved through a greater understand-
ing and use of silence.
In some clinics at the University of New Mexico Law School, we
now introduce the concept of silence and the importance of listen-
ing for silence as clients disclose the emotional and often
disturbing details of their legal problems. Drawing on the work of
Diana Eades, we offer two formats for interviewing: the scripted
interview and the uninterrupted narrative. The scripted interview
is the more typical interview style of lawyers in which the student
uses a series of open- and closed-ended questions to learn the cli-
ent's story. The uninterrupted narrative interview allows the client
to set the pace and determine the organizational framework for
the story, with the clinical student holding an attentive and re-
spectful silence.
The Robyn Kina case is distributed to UNM clinical students
along with information about the gendered and cross-cultural as-
pects of silence. Students need to understand the socio-linguistic
and literary dimensions of silence; they need to hear silences-
their own and those of others-and give silence its communicative
importance before they are prepared to experiment with it as part
217. Id. at 218 (citing a handbook Eades wrote to assist lawyers in Queensland to com-
municate more effectively with their Aboriginal clients).
218. Seeid. at 216.
219. See id.
220 See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 225.
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of their interviewing techniques. The shared and/or divergent cul-
tural backgrounds of the client and the clinical student, the nature
of the legal problem, and the purpose of the interview all help in
determining what interview format is most appropriate.
D. Silence and Silencing in the Law School Classroom: A Synthesis
As I indicated earlier, my analysis in this second section on
pedagogical discourse depends on the first section in which I ex-
plain that silence has importance from both linguistic and racial
performative perspectives. Using silence as a heteroglossic tech-
nique in the classroom is context-sensitive; students may respond
differently to the technique because silence is culturally relative.
The dynamics of silencing are very difficult to alter because the
hierarchical effects are so pervasive after just a few weeks of law
school. It is difficult, therefore, to move out of a "banking" method
of teaching and to create a more egalitarian learning environment.
Nonetheless, an increased awareness of the silencing effects of tra-
ditional teaching methods in the classroom may help mitigate law
students' sense of alienation from their studies and work.
Moreover, an awareness of silence and the silencing effects of
the "banking" method can disrupt the hegemonic racial dynamics
of the classroom. It is likely that students of color, including mono-
lingual-English, African American students, bring different
linguistic, thus heteroglossic, backgrounds into the classroom; their
backgrounds may include different orientations towards silence and
voice. Creating a classroom conversation about the "culture[s] of
silence" can validate the students' lived experiences and normalize
the cadences and rhythms of english. 23 These pedagogical interven-
tions can have centrifugal effects-decentering effects on the
linguistic and racial dynamics of the classroom. 4
223. I have borrowed this capitalization counter-convention from BILL ASHCROFr ET
AL., supra note 119. The editors note the "need to distinguish between what is proposed as a
standard code, English (the language of the erstwhile imperial centre), and the linguistic
code, english, which has been transformed and subverted into several distinctive varieties
throughout the world." Id. at 4.
224. My analysis quite probably depends on classrooms that have a critical mass of stu-
dents of color. With the re-segregation of higher education that is increasingly the reality
for many institutions because of judicial and electoral policies, the imperative of altering
the racial and linguistic dynamics may be somewhat diminished.
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E. Silence as a Racialized Performance in the Law School Classroom
During the Spring 2000 semester I taught a seminar on Race, Racisms
and the Law. The class was highly diverse with students from varied ra-
cial, linguistic, and geographic backgrounds with differing ideological
commitments. One of the more vocal students was a self-described "Chicano
nationalist. ,225 He was passionate, provocative, and controversial, and his
comments improved the class by leading me to include discussions on inter-
nal and external U.S. colonies and on assimilation as co-optation,
especially the socialization and professionalization of scholars of color.
Midway through the semester I distributed a version of this Article and
led the students in a discussion of racialized silence. This student was no-
ticeably quiet. He was also silent during the next class meeting. During a
break I heard one of the students ask him why he was not participating. He
responded that he agreed with my analysis that silence can be a form of re-
sistance against the curriculum and pedagogy of the law school classroom
and he had, therefore, decided to remain silent.
I overheard this conversation. Perhaps I was meant to overhear it. I was
perplexed and vexed by his self-silencing, asking myself-but why in this
class, why in my class? This class was, after all, an opportunity to talk
about the oppressive aspects of the curriculum and the pedagogy.
His silence was very effective from many perspectives. First, his
silence was performative in the sense of being self-conscious, calcu-
lated, and an exercise of power.C Second, his silence was
performative in the sense of seizing the attention of his fellow stu-
dents and making them and me aware that he was communicating
without words. Third, his silence was a challenge to the classroom
dynamics as they simultaneously both defied and reproduced the
traditional content and format of the law school classroom. After
all, the subject may have been Race and Racisms, but the materials
studied were mostly cases, statutes, and law review articles, and the
discussion in many ways depended on a legal vocabulary, on pre-
suppositions and norms that support a capitalistic and imperialistic
225. I provided these pages to the student and asked for his response. I received an
e-mail from him telling me that he had no comment. I interpreted his message to mean he
did not object or explicitly agree with my version. Nevertheless, his enigmatic response was
a sophisticated use of implicature.
226. See RICHARD POIRIER, THE PERFORMING SELF (1992) (challenging static meanings
and readings of literature and offering instead an approach to literature that accepts its
political qualities and explores the potentiality of performance as a process of self-discovery,
self-watching, and self-pleasuring). Literature with this self-involved way of reading is of-
fered as "an object lesson for other more distinctly political or social performances." Id. at
xxi.
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political system, even though we were attempting to expose such
norms and assumptions.
This example illustrates several points I am making about si-
lence and silencing. First, his silence was a powerful form of
communication. It attracted the attention of the class and de-
manded to be interpreted. Second, his silence was racialized and
performative. This student often peppered his remarks with Span-
ish phrases and spoke forcefully from a perspective that was
framed by his Chicano identity. I understood his silence to be a
similar reference to his bilingual background, to his recognition
that silence has a different and nuanced valence within the Indo-
Hispano culture of Northern New Mexico and that he was con-
sciously placing himself within that frame with his calculated
silence. By doing so, he was using silence to mark himself racially,
as he had often done with his spoken Spanish. Finally, his silence
was ambiguous in that it was difficult to know whether he was silent
or silenced, whether he was exercising power or experiencing
powerlessness. Perhaps the point of his performance for purposes
of this analysis is that these are not either/or situations. Perhaps
silence and silencing sometimes, although not always, operate si-
multaneously.
I would like to think that his reading of this Article expands his
performative choices so he can make a strategic move from feeling
silenced to deliberately holding silence. Consequendy, his internal
script that interpreted the silence has been altered.
III: SILENCE AND SILENCING AND LEGAL DISCOURSE
[SorJuana's] work tells us something, but to understand that
something we must realize that it is utterance surrounded by
227
silence: the silence of the things that cannot be said .
This section discusses the centripetal and centrifugal forces
within the language of the law. The previous section focused on
the silencing within the law school classroom of certain sectors of
the classroom-women and persons of color particularly. This sec-
tion focuses on the silencing within legal discourse and public
policy debates of certain ideas and topics, most notably issues of
race.
227. OCTAVIO PAZ, SORJUANA, OR THE TRAPs OF FAITH 5 (1988).
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I contend that the silencing of race throughout the legal system,
in classrooms and in courtrooms, is one of the principal mecha-
nisms for maintaining the ideology of White supremacy. It is the
practice of hegemony through education. From a Freirean per-
spective, students are denied the ability to participate in liberatory
education because of this systemic silencing about racism and
other types of oppression.
Issues are systematically and consistently framed within legal dis-
course to elide issues of race (as well as sexual identity, class, and
other identity characteristics)."' The silencing of racialized infor-
mation is largely why the law feels alien and alienating to those for
whom race or other identity characteristics are reality-defining and
often the starting point for legal analysis. 9 Maintaining silence
about facts or aspects that are reality-defining often makes one feel
complicit in one's own marginalization. Moreover, this silence,
which is imposed through the norms of legal discourse, diminishes
one's ability to deploy silence for a range of other communicative
strategies. That is, it is more difficult to be silent, to hold silence as a
strategy of resistance and agency when silence is de rigueur anyway.
The silencing of information about race, gender, and other
identity characteristics operates at two levels: at the level of indi-
vidual disputes-what I am calling the "micro level," where
incidents in which race is arguably relevant are resolved with a
resolute inattention to, and silencing of, the racial aspects; and at
the level of whole areas of law, the "macro level," which deter-
mines how these areas of the law are defined and how disciplinary
and professional worldviews are formed. One way that White su-
premacy is maintained is through multiple levels of obfuscation
and elision. In this instance White supremacy is maintained by
maintaining a world view in which race does not matter and there-
fore does not have to be discussed, especially by those legal
actors-judges, prosecutors, legislators, and lawyers-who make
and enforce the rules by which this society is regulated and gov-
erned.
In 1988 Lucinda Finley wrote a passionate plea to feminists "to
grapple with the nature of law itself... and the extent to which its
language and its process of reasoning are built on male concep-
228. See infra text accompanying notes 229-54.
229. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education 11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 1-14 (1989) (arguing that a "perspectiveless" norm in the law
school classroom burdens minority students by creating the dual dilemmas of objectifica-
tion and subjectification).
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tions of problems and of harms and on male ... methods of analy-
sis." 23° In 1989 she responded to her own exhortation with an
article that analyzed women's silence in the law and the connec-
tion of legal reasoning and discourse to that silence. 23 ' Finley
argued that legal language and reasoning are male and patriar-
chal, and that efforts at making meaningful change are hampered
by the fact that the law constitutes a certain social reality for the
powerful by making social arrangements appear normal, neutral,
and inevitable. 32 This androcentric quality of legal language pres-
ents women with a dilemma. Devising a woman-centered legal
language is not a feasible alternative, but neither can the law realis-
tically be abandoned.2 3  Finley asserts, "[1]aw will continue to
reflect and shape prevailing social and individual understandings
of problems, and thus will continue to play a role in silencing and
discrediting women., 23 4 Finley concludes that "critical awareness of
the dilemma is itself important."
235
Finley's description of legal language and legal discourse is even
more salient when applied to White supremacy. As Professor Cren-
shaw argues, issues are systematically and consistently framed
2 6
within legal discourse to elide the race and class characteristics;
legal education requires fundamental change in order to eliminate
the hegemonic effects of legal language and legal discourse.
230. Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on
Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U. L. Rv. 352, 384 (1988).
231. See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 886 (1989). Finley explains "discourse" as
a "term[] used in poststructuralist theory, especially as developed in the work of Michel
Foucault, [that] 'is not a language or a text but a historically, socially, and institutionally
specific structure of statements, terms, categories, and beliefs."' Id. at 888 n.12.
232. See id. at 886 passim.
233. See id. at 906.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 909.
236. Gregory Bateson coined the term frame "to explain how individuals exchange sig-
nals that allow them to agree upon the level of abstraction at which any message is
intended." Deborah Tannen, What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN DISCOURSE PROCESSING 137, 141 (Roy 0. Freedle ed., 1979).
237. At about the same time that Lucinda Finley was writing about the patriarchal na-
ture of legal language and legal discourse, Kimberlh Crenshaw was devising a similar
racialized analysis and urging that more attention be paid to issues of race in legal educa-
tion. See Crenshaw, supra note 229, at 1-14.
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A. Macro-level Silences and Silencing in Legal Discourse
The Framers [of the Constitution] sought to mute the con-
troversies and contradictions surrounding race and slavery by
omission. They tried to erace the issue.... This eracism in-
fects legal education and limits its effectiveness... We must
learn to talk about the deep issues in law and culture, to
openly debate them rather than smother them in silence. 38
Many law students arrive at law school with intentions of engag-
ing in social change through public interest work but leave after
three years with commitments to careers with law firms and corpo-
rate America. 239 This pernicious change in personal values and
commitments away from progressive lawyering toward law firms
and other organizations that support the status quo reveals the he-
gemony of law school socialization. This socializing works by
creating a certain professional worldview that is supported by ex-
planations of how the law facilitates and maintains social
arrangements-a silencing, in effect. If students' perceptions and
aspirations are formed within a disciplinary discourse largely un-
charted with respect to race or gender, then students are deprived
of a basic understanding of the ways in which the law maintains the
current allocation of power and privilege along racial and gender
fault lines.
Property law, a course taught in virtually every law school to
every first year law student, serves as a good example of the social-
izing process of law school. In this society, the most significant
forms of property in most people's lives are wage income, home
ownership, and employer-funded pension plans. Yet, most students
complete two semesters of property classes with virtually no under-
standing of the historical or contemporary explanations for the
wide disparities in property ownership between Whites and per-
sons of color or the role the law has played in residential
segregation. Moreover, there is virtually no mention of the coloni-
zation project of the United States, conducted through war and
intrigue, that divested native/indigenous peoples from their lands,
and conquered one-third of the territory of Mexico, all of Puerto
238. Dirk Tillotson, Constitutional Eracism (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
239. See ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD
AND BEYOND (1992).
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Rico, and the Pacific islands of Guam, the Phillipines, and Ha-
wai'i. 240 Instead, students are drilled with the particularities of
future interests, the Statute of Uses, and acquiring title over wild
animals. In short, the law of property, as currently conceived, does
not provide an analysis for students about property, power, and
White supremacy-either in terms of how the larger society came
to collectively own the land and resources that is now the United
States, or how White people came to individually own most of the
land and the resources of the country.
George Lipsitz uses the term "the possessive investment in
whiteness 2 4' to describe the
relationship between whiteness and asset accumulation in our
society, to connect attitudes to interests, to demonstrate that
white supremacy is usually less a matter of direct, referential,
and snarling contempt than a system for protecting the privi-
leges of whites by denying communities of color opportunities
for asset accumulation and upward mobility.
242
Lipsitz's analysis supports my contention that silence and silenc-
ing in legal discourse is crucial in the maintenance of White
supremacy, because lawyers, who are often strategically positioned
throughout society to unmask, disrupt, and subvert it, overwhelm-
ingly choose to benefit from it. Legal discourse and law school's
socialization ensures it. The "[c]ollective exercises of power that
relentlessly channel rewards, resources, and opportunities from
one group to another , 243 are rendered invisible, normal, and inevi-
table so long as race remains an inappropriate topic for classroom
discussion and legal discourse in general, and so long as law stu-
dents are not given the analytical tools and straightforward data
about these wealth-producing and wealth-allocating processes. This
is the case even though those collective exercises of power are fa-
cilitated through legal procedures and legal institutions.
Property law could be reconceptualized and refrained to de-
scribe the workings of legal structures and processes that maximize
the opportunities for Whites to become home owners and wealth
240. See generally RONALD TArARI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICUL-
TURAL AMERICA (1993); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492-
PRESENT (1999).
241. GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEO-
PLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (1998).
242. Id. at viii.
243. Id. at 20.
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accumulators, while minimizing the opportunities for non-Whites
to enjoy the same social benefits. As described by Lipsitz, public
policy after the New Deal Era denied the farm worker and domes-
tic labor sectors that were disproportionately minority the
protections that were extended to Whites under the Wagner Act and
the Social Security Act.2 4 The trade unions negotiated higher
wages, medical insurance, pensions, and job security, but, because
of their blatantly discriminatory practices, Whites were overwhelm-
ingly the beneficiaries.2 45 It was federal housing agencies that most
directly employed racist practices to prevent minorities from bene-
fiting from a massive post-war housing boom and federally
subsidized loan funds.246 The Federal Housing Agency ("FHA") and
private lenders diverted housing loans toward White communities,
thereby creating White suburbs and abandoned communities of
color.247 Through a plethora of public investment projects in urban
renewal, highway construction, and the expansion of water sup-
plies and sewage facilities, societal resources to meet the housing
and shelter needs of White residential enclaves were allocated at
the expense of communities of color.24" Lipsitz provides the follow-
ing example: "The Federal Housing Administration and the
Veterans Administration financed more than $120 billion worth of
new housing between 1934 and 1962, but less than 2 percent of this
real estate was available to nonwhite families-and most of that
small amount was located in segregated areas."2 49 Such interlocking
policies as red-lining, sales of substandard housing, and foreclo-
sures, overseen by the FHA and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, destroyed the housing markets in inner-
cities.25 ° If all of this were not enough, state and local governments
placed in these communities "prisons, incinerators, toxic waste
dumps, and other projects that further depopulated these areas"
and led to decreased political power.51
Property law is not the only law school subject in which White
supremacy, its analysis of race, and its allocational consequences
go unexamined. Criminal law and constitutional law are also not
subjected to a comprehensive and systematic analysis of how they
244. See id. at 5.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 6-7.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 6.
250. See id. at 8.
251. Id.
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construct and sustain the imbalance in racial relations in this soci-
ety. Criminal law is the law school subject in which race is dealt
with most explicitly, largely because a disproportionate number of
the defendants are men of color.5 2 More than in other subject ar-
eas, the insights from the perspective of a critique of White
supremacy, such as the demonizing of juveniles of color through
the over-policing of communities of color,2 ' 3 the criminalization of
childbearing for drug-addicted mothers ,254 the use of racial profil-
ing in policing,55 the wrongful association of drug usage with
communities of color, or the lack of adequate legal representation
(even in death penalty cases) ,256 have been integrated into the con-
ventional discourse about crime in this society. Unfortunately,
however, stereotypes about people of color as violent and preda-
tory are reinforced in the law school curriculum by what is said as
well as what is left unsaid. The relentless pressure to get through
the conventional topics, especially since the multistate bar exam
further structures what is to be taught and how students are to be
257
socialized and professionalized with inattention to race,  leaves
little time to establish a sociolegal context that connects the crimi-
nal justice system to the de/formation of racial relations.
Constitutional law is an area in which race has been central both
to the framing of the document and the subsequent interpretation
of its provisions by the Supreme Court and the other federal
courts. Yet the word slavery, representing the single most pressing
and divisive issue among the delegates at the Constitutional Con-
vention, is not even mentioned, despite its centrality to the framing
process.15s This "omission of references to or acknowledgment of
252. See generally KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE
FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT AND OTHER MICROAGGRESSIONS (1998).
253. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT (1999).
254. See generally LAURA E. GOMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECU-
TORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE (1997).
255. See David Harris, When Success Breeds Atttack: The Coming Backlash Against Racial Pro-
filing Studies, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2001); David Harris, Factors For Reasonable
Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. LJ. 659 (1994).
256. See generally Louis P. POJMAN, THE DEATH PENALTY: FOR AND AGAINST (1998);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS:
LETHAL INJUSTICE (1998).
257. SeeJoan Howarth, Teaching in the Shadow ofthe Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927 (1997).
258. See Tillotson, supra note 238, at "Introduction" (unpaginated article). Tillotson
notes that James Madison considered climate as one of two causes that divided the States;
the other difference among them was their division "principally from the effects of their
having or not having slaves." Id. at note 35 (citing PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY 23 (1981)).
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racial issues that either implicitly or explicitly present themselves"
has been dubbed "eracism." 259 Constitutional law is everywhere
taught as the allocation of powers between the federal government
and the state and the separation of powers among the three
branches of government. 60 Yet whether with respect to the threat of
secession to federalism, the relation of slavery to the Commerce
Clause, or the Dred Scott case to judicial review, racial issues might
vaguely be hinted at within cases and texts, but meaningful racial
implications are usually completely ignored.
While this section focuses on three examples of basic law school
courses that typically ignore issues of race, the examples are some-
what idiosyncratic, because virtually any course could be chosen
from virtually any law school for a parallel analysis of the elisions of
race. This type of organization is both a matter of decisions by in-
dividual law professors and evidence of a broader discourse of law
embedded within a White racial context that is rendered transpar-
ent and therefore almost impossible to name and problematize.
That is the centripetal force and the hegemony of this "un-raced"
discourse.
B. Micro-level Silences and Silencing in Legal Discourse
Not only is legal doctrine developed to obfuscate the impor-
tance of the racial context to entire areas of law, but this silence
is maintained in particular disputes. Legal actors-judges, law-
yers, scholars, deans, and professors-are socialized to maintain a
decorum that protects this silencing. In this section, I use two
cases as examples of situations in which the race of the parties is
never mentioned in the published opinions. Given the impor-
tance of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 26 to the development of
the law of sexual harassment, it should not be surprising that some
attention has been paid, particularly by feminists, to the fact that
the race of neither party is referenced in the opinions of the vari-
259. Tillotson, supra note 238, at n.2. Eracism is described as a "power play... a rewrit-
ing of our shared history as an exclusive and ostensibly objective or 'perspectiveless' text. It
is a dangerous form of historical revisionism that seeks to deny the standing of certain
groups. It elevates the history of some and denies that of others. It colors the constitutional
nation as White, or 'transparent,' simultaneously denying the existence of other perspec-
tives or colors." Id. at Section 3 (1) (unpaginated article).
260. See e.g. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 2 (3d ed.
2000).
261. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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ous courts that considered the issues. The other example I provide
is a little known tort case, Williams v. City of New York. 62
Perhaps the best known case involving gender discrimination
and sexual harassment is the Vinson case. Yet the District Court, the
D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court never mention that the women
who were harassed and the harasser are African American. The in-
cidents involving the abuse occurred in the 1970's, and the case
was litigated in the 1980's, before intersectionality theories,263
which argue for the linkage between and among such identity
markers as race and gender, had become familiar in scholarship by
Race Crits and Fem Crits.
Even today, few discrimination cases have been filed effectively
and prosecuted alleging discrimination on the basis of both race
and sex. The early requirement that women of color choose be-
tween these characteristics in order to ground a discrimination
claim created an unnecessarily high hurdle.2
What is interesting for purposes of this examination of silence
and silencing is the resistance of White feminist scholars and con-
temporary casebook editors to recognizing the potential salience
of race in the legal arena. The commentaries of legal feminists re-
garding the issue of race in the Vinson case are particularly
instructive. In 1991, Professor MacKinnon wrote:
As I mentioned, both Mechelle Vinson and Lillian Garland
are African-American women. Wasn't Mechelle Vinson sexu-
ally harassed as a woman? Wasn't Lillian Garland pregnant as
a woman? They thought so. The whole point of their cases
was to get their injuries understood as "based on sex," that is,
because they were women. The perpetrators, and the policies
under which they were disadvantaged, saw them as women.
What is being a woman if it does not include being oppressed
as one? When the Reconstruction Amendments "gave Blacks
the vote," and Black women still could not vote, weren't they
kept from voting "as women?" When African-American
262. 564 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
263. See, e.g., Kimberlh Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); Harris, supra note 181, at
604.
264. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gen-
der, 1991 DUKE L. J. 365 (analyzing Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) in which an airline was permitted to prohibit the hairstyle of a Black woman whose
hair was braided into "corn rows." In alleging a discrimination claim under Tide VII, she
was required to elect whether the basis for the mistreatment was her race or her sex.)
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women are raped two times as often as white women, aren't
they raped as women? That does not mean their race is irrele-
vant and it does not mean that their injuries can be
understood outside a racial context. Rather, it means that
"sex" is made up of the reality of the experiences of all
women, including theirs. It is a composite unit rather than a
divided unitary whole, such that each woman, in her way, is
all women. So, when white women are sexually harassed or
lose their jobs because they are pregnant, aren't they women
too?
265
In a series of open letters published in the same volume, one
woman responded to MacKinnon's discussion of the Vinson case,
stating, "[a] limited concept of experience "as a woman" is implicit
in your treatment of Mechelle Vinson's agency in the formulation
of sexual harassment legal doctrine. Mechelle Vinson brought ac-
tion against her employer as a woman, but more accurately as a
Black woman. ' '266 In 1992, another commentator observed,
The Supreme Court opinion in Meritor v. Vinson, purports to
look at the record as a whole, yet it fails to make any mention
of the fact that Mechelle Vinson was African-American. The
Court demonstrated no perception of the interplay between
racial and sexual discrimination as directed against women of
color, or the potential impact of that interplay on Vinson's
credibility. Yet, "discrimination against women of color often
operates differently, is fueled by different factors and results
in different stereotypes, than discrimination against either
men of color or white women." The Court's failure to discuss
Vinson's race reveals their perspective that it was not legally
significant or even relevant. One legal commentator suggests
that "only white people have been able to imagine that sexism
and racism are separate experiences.",
67
265. Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theoy, or What is a White Woman Anyway?
4YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 13,20 (1991).
266. Open Letters to CatharineMacKinnon, 4YALEJ.L. &FEMINISM 177, 180 (1991).
267. Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply Unbelievable: Reasonable Women and Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment, 10 LAW & EQUALITY 285, 294 (1992) (quoting Mary E. Becker, Sympo-
sium: The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: Needed in the Nineties:
Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment,
78 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1675-76 (1991); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 604 (1990)).
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While these and other scholars have written about Mechelle Vin-
son's racial background,68 I have found only one reference that
notes that the harasser, Sidney Taylor, was also African-
American. 69 Students of employment discrimination are not likely
to know about the racial context of the Vinson case because virtu-
ally none of the basic hornbooks or casebooks makes any mention
of it. 2v° It is difficult, if not impossible, for teachers and students to
interrogate the decision by the Courts to elide information about
race if the information is not available to them. Consequently,
their mindset about legal discourse and the salience of race within
it is not likely to be challenged or changed.
As I have become more sensitized to this silence about race, I
have noticed it even in situations in which the racial context is obvi-
ously salient. For example, Williams v. City of New York is a personal
injury and wrongful death case where the decedent's mother sought
to recover damages from the City of New York for the negligence of
the Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Agency.271 The
decedent, Thomas Williams, was a twenty-year-old high school
272graduate who had been working at McDonald's for three years. He
lived with his mother, who suffered from arthritis, and his four
nieces and nephews. 7 3 He helped with the chores, cared for the
children, bought his own clothes, and planned or hoped to begin
college soon. 4 He earned approximately $4500 per year and con-
tributed fifty dollars per week to the household and ten dollars
worth of groceries.
The jury entered a verdict in the gross amount of $600,000 (or
$510,000 net, reduced by 15%, the decedent's share of the fault). 276
268. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereo-
types: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1003,
1027 n.105 ("Black women who have tried to get relief under Title VII because they are
black and female have had mixed results."); Alan R. Kabat & Debra S. Katz, Racial and Sexual
Harassment Employment Law, in II ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: CURRENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 547, 554 (1999).
269. See Anna Maria Marshall, Closing the Gaps: Plaintiffs in Pivotal Sexual Harassment
Cases, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 761, 776 n.24 (1998)
270. See MICHAELJ. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION 185, 587, 627, 641, 643, 655, 657, 662-71, 684 (1997) (failing to mention race
whenever the Vinson opinion is referenced or reproduced); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., CIVIL
RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 180-94 (1997) (same).
271. 564 N.Y.S. 2d 464, 464-65 (App. Div. 1991).
272. See id. at 465.
273. See id at 465-66.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 465.
276. See id.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of New York reduced the gross
damages to $325,000 (or $276,250 net), after concluding that the
decedent had never gained consciousness after the accident and
therefore was not entitled to recover damages for the pain and suf-
fering element of the personal injury claim.27v
In computing the loss of support, the jury can consider antici-
pated lifetime earnings and loss of services to the household and
the beneficiary's life expectancy.'8 In this case, if we assume a life
expectancy of his mother of seventy years and a current age of
forty years, the loss of her son's life is worth about $760 per
month. Is race not relevant when considering these elements?
Would a White son with aspirations of college in the context of
responsible life habits be valued equally? Is it likely that juries do
not notice the race of plaintiffs or their representatives? Actuarial
tables are routinely shown with racial and gender data because life
expectancy and work-life expectancy are both a function of one's
race and gender in this society and others.279 Yet the legal actors in
the Williams case concluded that race did not matter and should
not be mentioned.
The norms and behaviors of professionalism-the prevailing
worldview-that are authorized and preferred within the dominant
and purportedly race-neutral discourse impede students from un-
derstanding that race is often salient in the resolution of issues that
seemingly have nothing to do with race. For example, most tort
cases, such as the Williams case, fail to mention the race of the
wrongful death victim, even though the victim's race is likely to be
a factor in the determination of the worth of the decedent's life.
Making it uncomfortable for those in the legal profession to talk
about race in any situation makes it unlikely that it will receive a
systemic and intensive analysis.
C. A Synthesis of Silence and Silencing in Legal Discourse
In the first two sections of this Article my analysis focused on in-
dividual and cultural dimensions of silence and silencing within
different linguistic areas from a pedagogical perspective. My pur-
277. See id. at 465-66.
278. See EDWARDJ. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 370 (1992).
279. See e.g., Expectation of Life and Expectation of Death, by Race, Sex, and Age, 1999, in Am.
JUR. 2D DESK BOOK 435 (2000).
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pose in discussing the silencing of the topic of race within legal
discourse was to demonstrate the effects of silence and silencing
outside of a specific communicative context and in a complex
multi-cultural situation. In this section, I develop several related
ideas: 1) throughout this society (and it may be equally true in
many other societies) there is an amnesia about the historical con-
nections between the law and the racial divisions in the society; 2)
this amnesia is reinforced by the law schools who teach the law as
though it were race-neutral; and 3) legal actors-lawyers, judges,
legislators, and law professors-maintain this silence, valorizing
this race-neutral illusion with norm-setting consequences for the
entire society. The result is that this society has no widely accepted
vocabulary for a discourse on race.
I began this section with a quote from Octavio Paz, referring to
the Seventeenth Century Mexican nun and poet, SorJuana In6z de
la Cruz. Paz, her biographer, writes that during her lifetime, her
poems were widely read in Mexico, Spain, and the entire Spanish-
speaking world.280 More recently she has again come into literary
vogue as a brilliant writer, an iconoclast, and a feminist.28 She lived
an extraordinary life, first, as a favorite of royalty of New Spain (as
Mexico was then known), and later, as a famous and controversial
intellectual. 8 2 She is said to have had every type of gift and talent:
she was beautiful, elegant, articulate, courageous, and blessed with
an unusual breadth of intelligence. Unexpectedly, she gave up the
world and entered a convent where
[s]he [wrote] love poems, verses for songs and dance tunes,
profane comedies, sacred poems, an essay in theology, and an
autobiographical defense of the right of women to study and
cultivate their minds.282
At the height of her international fame, however, she "gives up
everything, surrenders her library and collections, renounces lit-
erature, and finally ... dies at the age of forty-six."8 4
280. See PAZ, supra note at 227, at v.
281. See CARLOS FUENTES, THE BURIED MIRROR: REFLECTIONS ON SPAIN AND THE NEW
WORLD 201-04 (1992).
282. See id. at 203 ("She won praise and fame, but promptly saw the difficulties of being
a woman writer in colonial Mexico. Not only would she face male opposition and ecclesias-
tical oversight, but her time would be drained and her security challenged.").
283. Paz, supra note 227, at 1.
284. Id. at 2.
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During SorJuana's life, she was silenced onto death. Her writing
was imbedded in silence: "the silence of the things that cannot be
said. ,,285 Her writings are examples of a forced implicature. Paz cau-
tions us that:
When we read Sor Juana, we must recognize the silence sur-
rounding her words. That silence is not absence of meaning:
on the contrary, what cannot be said is anything that touches
not only on the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church but also on
the ideas, interests, and passions of its princes and its Orders.
Sor Juana's words are written in the presence of a prohibi-
tion; that prohibition is embodied in an orthodoxy supported
by a bureaucracy of prelates and judges.86
Today, unlike Sor Juana, public intellectuals are no longer at
the theological mercy of the Catholic Church, its Bishops, and in-
quisitors.5 7 But I contend that there is a legal orthodoxy with its
bureaucracy of professors, lawyers, and judges who seek to, and do,
exercise a similar control over public discourse and debate as the
Church did in the Seventeenth Century.
This is the ultimate centripetal effect of racialized silences. The
legal bureaucracy has declared public debate a race-neutral zone
and enforces it through its design of legal education and legal in-
stitutions.
The orthodoxy on racial silence is so diffused and its effects so
implicated in legal processes that it all is of one piece. Noting the
implication of Sor Juana in her own silencing, Octavio Paz writes:
"[U]sually the author is part of the system of tacit but imperative
prohibitions that forms the code of the utterable in every age and
society .... [T]ransgressions were, and are, punished with sever-
ity. ' 2ss Unlike the Church's orthodoxy of the Seventeenth Century,
today's orthodoxy on race and silence hardly depends on enforce-
ment through a sovereign. In and out of the law's bureaucracies (in
and out of law classrooms, in and out of faculty meetings, in and out
of courtrooms), we are effectively silenced about race, racism, and
oppression.
285. Id. at 5.
286. Id. at 6.
287. Even SorJuana, although silenced at the time, was ultimately victorious given the
contemporary prominence of her work and the resonance of her voice. See Fuentes, supra
note 281, at 203 ("Yet she defeated her silencers. Her baroque poetry had the capacity to
hold forever the shapes and words of the abundance of the New World ......
288. PAZ, supra note 227, at 6.
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D. Silence and Silencing: A Personal Narrative
The date is Monday, April 11, 1995; there is a faculty meeting
scheduled for 4 p.m. I am in my third year of teaching; many days I feel I
am not doing well. My first Article has been published,29 -but at times I feel
oddly diminished by it in the eyes of my colleagues. I conclude that most
have not read it and that those who have merely dismiss it. It is not really
legal scholarship, they say. I am advised to write a traditional article
showing that I can analyze cases or interpret statutes. But I am a story
teller and a yarn weaver; it comes to me through imitation, from sitting
near my grandfather's wheelchair to listen to his folktale 290 and at my
grandmother's kitchen table to hear her hilarious mitotes y chismes about
neighbors, friends, and relatives. Stories defined my childhood world; they
drew the lines for me around what was funny, polite, and irreverent. As
kids, we learned about the adult world through stories-about pregnancies,
break-ups, illness, death, and even sex, in the vaguest of terms. And so
stories become the way I make sense of my adult world-my life as a
student, a lawyer, a mother, and now as a professor. Professor. By May
1995, the title no longer seems so strange when I see it next to my name.
Professor Montoya. I am growing to like teaching, writing, and public
speaking.
But I digress. On this April afternoon, I enter the women's bathroom on
the second floor of the law school. I am in the bathroom stall when my eye
catches my name scrawled on the door. I feel myself inhale, my heart is rac-
ing, my eyes fill with tears. There is graffiti covering the top third of the
door. It has been marked through, but with the door at an angle, I can
make out the words. I am having trouble breathing, my knees are buckling,
my ears are buzzing, my eyes and nose are leaking. I read the words: IF
YOU LIKE HEAD / AND HAVE A BIG BLACK DICK / PROF.
MONTOYA WILL GIVE ITA LICK.
I make it down to the Dean's office. I am crying incoherently. I tell him
there is graffiti about me, in the women's bathroom. He does not ask what
it says. I realize he does not want to know. Instead, he instructs his assis-
tant to go see about it. She returns and says it has been taken care of I
try to compose myselffor the faculty meeting. I sit in the chairs against the
wall rather than at the table. During the Dean's report, he tells the faculty
that there has been an incident. A resolution is introduced, deploring the
289. See Montoya, supra note 7.
290. See generally 1 & 2 JUAN B. RAEL, CUENTOS ESPAIOLES DE COLORADO Y NUEVO
MEXICO (SPANISH FOLK TALES OF COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO) (1977) (publishing a col-
lection of stories like the oral ones of my grandfather).
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incident. Someone wants to know what has happened. Another colleague
says that she saw the graffiti, and it was a vile expression of racism and
sexism. Someone sitting next to me passes me a note that says, "time for
mdscaras. , ' Finally, I say that the graffiti was about me, but I don't give
any details.
Are your wondering why I was silent? In retrospect, I was silent because
I had been well-trained, even in situations of intense emotions. I read the
signals of those around me; I knew how to act-I knew to be silent.
After the meeting, a colleague drives me home. I fall into my husband's
arms. I cannot talk; he does not know what has happened. I cry for what
seems like hours. Finally, he or I or both of us together decide to go buy some
spray paint and return to the law school. By now, all that remains is
darkly blackened words. I hear the bee-bees in the spray paint as my hus-
band stands next to me removing any trace of the offending words. That is
his intent. He wants it to be gone, as do L That night I write the following:
An Open Letter to a Graffiti Writer:
On Monday afternoon, I found your message in the women's bath-
room. I have no other way of reaching you so I have decided to
respond to you with an open letter. Graffiti of the kind you wrote is
hate speech and it can only be countered by being responded to. Si-
lence in the face of hate speech makes us all complicit.
We are part of a community that is charged with delicate and weighty
responsibilities. As a law school, we are charged with studying the
norms and the rules we use to regulate the behavior of all of us who
come together as a society. We place a high value on our ability to lis-
ten to diverse opinions and to work towards consensus, or when
disputes occur to resolve them. As a community, we strive to commu-
nicate about difficult issues. As lawyers, effective communication is
our product and our process.
Graffiti is the antithesis of what we aspire to at this law school. Graf-
fiti is anonymous, public, secretive, intentional and harmful.
Graffiti2 is a grenade. Graffiti may hit the intended target but it also
splatters all those exposed to it.
291. See Montoya, supra note 7. ("Miiscaras," the Spanish word for masks, appears in the
title of my first article and refers to the mechanisms used by people of color to deflect the
effects of racism and other forms of subordination.)
292. Today in retrospect I would correct this to say "hate speech is a grenade."
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I try to picture you writing the vulgar words. It must have been
scary. If you had been caught, the penalties would have been severe,
possibly leading to expulsion. What could I have done to provoke
you to engage in such risky behavior? What button did I press that
so angered you that you decided to strike out at me and in striking
out at me put yourself in jeopardy.
You and I are now linked in a way we were not before. When I walk
through the forum or the lunchroom, I will wonder if you are iLatch-
ing me, perhaps waiting to attack again. I can't stop you. I can offer
you an alternative. You have gotten even. You have hurt and embar-
rassed me and I have to assume that you felt hurt by me in the past.
I invite you to write back or to suggest another way for us to commu-
nicate. Anonymously ifyou prefer.
-Prof. Montoya
I never sent the letter. Three days later I went to the campus police to file
a complaint. I wanted the incident investigated and knew that I would
have to initiate the process. When I told the officer in charge that I wanted
to complain about a hate crime, he misunderstood me and led me outside,
thinking I said I wanted to complain about a hit and run. I was handed a
clipboard and told to fill out a complaint form. I filled it out, but I never
filed it. I still have it in a folder.
Today that bathroom door remains a silent reminder of that April day. I
can still see the tiny streaks that formed when my husband sprayed away
those cruel words. In my mind, I see the words each time I enter that bath-
room. Today I feel a certain bond with that space-we were both defiled, the
space and L I never stopped using that bathroom; I did not want the inci-
dent to have power over me. But it has. Even now as my fingers tap out
these words. I have been very conflicted, to the point of a day-in-bed-
migraine, as I contemplated writing about this.2 93 It is hard to know what
gives me greater power-holding silence or breaking silence. Perhaps it
would be best to be silent and not spread this story, a story that gives birth
to thoughts that I cannot even imagine. Finally, I have decided that this
incident silenced me, that my silence has not been volitional. Perhaps that
was its purpose.
293. See WENDY S. HESFORD, FRAMING IDENTITIES: AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS
or PEDAGOGY 94-118 (1999) (analyzing the risks of constructing women and members of
other marginalized groups as victims rather than as agents of their own destinies, risks that
are implicit in the use of autobiographical practices, especially within academia that "too
often resorts to policy as its major paradigm of action." Id. at 118.)
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Were it to happen again, I tell myself that I would react very differently.
I would insist on taking a picture of the offending words, blowing it up
poster-size or bigger, and even hanging the toilet stall door in the forum, in
the center of the law school, for all to see. I truly do believe that hate speech
must be seen, heard, experienced, and, most importantly, responded to. My
instincts were correct that unhappy night when I wrote my open letter.
We can be socialized into silence even when we have been
trained to deal with ugly incidents involving race and genitalia and
sex. We can be deluded into a sense of false propriety by hate
speech. The virulent racism and sexism (homophobia and other
prejudices) of hate speech are too often covered over with silence.
For all the reasons I have been exploring in this Article, I contend
that the legal culture that we participate in, with its language, dis-
course, practices, and courtesies, inveigles us into silence about
incidents having to do with race, and most especially about inci-
dents having to do with race, genitalia, and sex acts. Round and
round we go; legal actors locked in dances to the lyrics of "Don't
ask, Don't tell."
Part of the explosive potential of racialized hate speech is that it
threatens to blow the lid off the silence that is typically maintained
over public discourse and legal discourse. The centripetal power of
legal discourse is tested during these episodes when the legal struc-
tures, institutions, and actors are forced to confront the tremendous
centrifugal force of hate speech. Suddenly there is racism at its na-
kedest. But our training and socializing wins the day, and silence
descends.
The orthodoxy on racial silence is so diffused and its effects so
implicated in legal processes that it all is of one piece. Noting the
implication of Sor Juana in her own silencing, Octavio Paz writes:
"[U]sually the author is part of the system of tacit but imperative
prohibitions that forms the code of the utterable in every age and
society .... [T]ransgressions were, and are, punished with sever-
ity.''294 Unlike the Church's orthodoxy of the Seventeenth Century,
today's orthodoxy on race and silence hardly depends on en-
forcement through a sovereign. In and out of the law's
bureaucracies (in and out of law classrooms, in and out of faculty
meetings, in and out of courtrooms), we are effectively silenced
about race, racism and oppression.
294. PAZ, supra note 227, at 6.
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CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to develop a theory about silence and si-
lencing as they relate to race relations in a polyglot and multiracial
society like the United States. This theorizing is done within the
developing traditions of the anti-subordinational movement called
LatCrit (or Latina/o critical legal theory). Consequently, this Arti-
cle draws primarily on scholarship, histories, narratives, and life
experiences from the Latina/o world.
Borrowing Bakhtinian vocabulary, this conceptualization of si-
lence and silencing incorporates the imagery of rotational forces,
i.e., the centripetal and centrifugal forces, to describe the center-
ing or de-centering effects of language. The centripetal force is
linked to the notion of a "unitary" language, one that allows only
limited meanings for words and for nonverbal cues, such as
silence. The centrifugal force is linked to "heteroglossia," the
multi-tongued meanings that are available for words and other
codes within languages that are free to draw from the experiences
of people and their diverse life experiences. While these forces are
typically conceived in opposition to one another, I prefer to think
of them as more relational than binary. Other students of Bakhtin
agree that:
[his] sense of duality does not arise from, nor does it depict, a
concept of binary opposition, but rather leads in the opposite
direction and stresses the fragility and ineluctably historical
nature of language .... The discursive interaction Bakhtin il-
lustrates, therefore, certainly suggests the presence of forces
that oppose and struggle; however, it seems to resemble the
reciprocal and unending dynamism, say, of Taoist yin and
yang tendencies more than a dichotomous process...."5
295. KALAMARAS, supra note 22, at 27 (internal quotations omitted).
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FIGURE 3
The following tabular display of the various aspects of discourse
that I have discussed in this Article may clarify the comparison of
these forces. (See Figure 4.) However, this type of display has the
tendency to be viewed as binary, which is why I have placed it here
in close proximity to the yin/yang symbol that I think better illus-
trates my analysis. (See Figure 3.) Because classroom silences can
be volitional or imposed or both at once, I have shown this rela-
tionship with a double arrow.
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FIGURE 4
CENTRIPETAL FORCES:
SILENCE
Heteroglossia
Silence as Racial Marker
Silence as Pedagogical Tool
Racialized Legal Discourses
Responses to Hate Speech
CENTRIFUGAL FORCES:
SILENCING
Unitary Language
Silencing as Racial Privilege
Silence as Classroom Self-Censoring
Traditional Legal Discourse
Hate Speech
Antonio Gramsci theorized that "[h]egemony ... operates in a
dualistic manner: as a general conception of life for the mass of
people, and as a scholastic programme or set of moral-intellectual
principles which is reproduced by a sector of the educated stra-
tum. '296 Consequently, because of the role that academics play in
the production and maintenance of the forces of hegemony, I
think it is particularly appropriate that LatCrits consider the he-
gemonic effects of the law school classroom and of legal discourse,
more generally.
LatCrits and other progressive scholars of color can use silence
in a counter-hegemonic manner, namely, we can learn to hear si-
lence in oral and written communications and inquire into its
meanings; we can learn to hold silence as a means of resistance or
as a way of communicating counter-majoritarian values; and we
can teach with and about silence in order to introduce courtesies
and modes of behavior that disrupt and subvert the dominant con-
ventions.
296. Carl Boggs, THE Two REVOLUTIONS: GRAMscl AND THE DILEMMAS OF WESTERN
MARXISM 161 (1984) (citations omitted).

